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Public Employee Bargaining in California:
The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act in the
Courts,
by
JOSEPH R. GRODIN*
The California Legislature has clearly been attempting to reconcile
by selective innovation the divergent elements inherent in public
employer-employee relations including the acknowledged
distinctions in the status and obligations of public and private
employees, as well as the various occupations and professions
represented by public employment.
CaliforniaFed'n of Teachers v. OxnardElementary Schools.1
In 1961 California became one of the first states in the nation to
recognize through a statute of general application the emerging
concept of public employee bargaining. 2 It was a rather limited
recognition to be sure; the Brown Act 3 gave public employees little
more than the right to join or not to join employee organizations 4 and
the right of employee organizations to be heard on employment
'This article was first published in 23 Hastings LJ. 719 (1972). For citation purposes,
please refer to the original source of the material.
*A.B., 1951, University of California, Berkeley; J.S.D., 1954, Yale Law School; Ph.D.,
1960, University of London; Associate Professor of Law, University of California,
Hastings College of the Law;, Member, California Bar. This article was undertaken
pursuant to contract between the author and the United States Department of Labor,
Bureau of Public Employee Labor Relations. The author is grateful to Mark Hardin, a
University of Oregon Law School student, for his research assistance and to Dr. B. V. H.
Schneider of the Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California at Berkeley, for
making available the Institute's extensive files.
1. 272 Cal. App. 2d 514,523,77 Cal. Rptr. 497,506 (1969).
2. The first was Wisconsin in 1959. There are now thirty-six states which make
statutory provision for public employee labor relations. Seidman, State Legislation on
Collective Bargainingby Public Employees, 22 LAB. L.J. 13 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Seidman].
3. Cal. Stat. 1961, ch. 1964, § 1, at 4141, codified at CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 3500-11
(West 1966), as amended, (Supp. 1971).
4. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3502 (West 1966).
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matters affecting their members.5 The statute left many questions
unanswered and provided no machinery for interpretation or
enforcement. Still, it was a beginning and one might have expected,
given such a head start, that California would have by now developed
a comprehensive, intelligible, and forward looking legislative
framework for labor relations in the public sector. Sadly, none of
those adjectives apply.
One problem with the present statutory scheme is its
fragmentation. At the time the Brown Act was adopted, special6
legislation already existed concerning labor relations for firefighters
and employees of various transit districts.7 The firefighters legislation
merely protected organizational rights, but the transit district statutes
provided for full collective bargaining with, in some cases, the right to
strike. 8 The Brown Act applied to all employees of state and local
government, but left the previous legislation intact. In 1965 the
legislature removed school district employees from coverage under
the Brown Act and adopted a separate statute, the Winton Act,
governing their labor relations. 9 That act, in turn, distinguished
between certificated and classified employees, and contained separate
provisions applicable to each. Finally, in 1968 the legislature adopted

5. Id. §§ 3503-05 (West 1966), as amended, (Supp. 1971).
6. CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1960-63 (West 1971), added by Cal. Stat. 1959, ch. 723, § 1,
at 2711-12, protects the right of firefighters (state and local) to form, join, or assist labor
organizations of their own choice, and to present and discuss with the governing body
grievances and recommendations regarding wages, hours and working conditions. The
statute also declares that firefighters "shall not have the right to strike, or to recognize a
picket line of a labor organization while in the course of the performance of their official
duties." Id. § 1962.
7. E.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §3 25051-52 (West 1965), added by Cal. Stat. 1955, ch.
1036, § 2, at 1960-61, covers employees of the Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District and
provides for bargaining in good faith with the representative chosen by a majority of the
employees within an appropriate unit (as determined by the state conciliation service, in
the event of a dispute) and for voluntary arbitration of unresolved bargaining disputes.
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE, App. 1, §§ 3.6(b)-(g) (West 1965), contains similar, but more
elaborate, provisions concerning the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority.
8. See Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen, 54 Cal. 2d 684, 355 P.2d 905, 8 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1960) (holding the protection of
"concerted activities" under the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act to
include the right to strike). An Alameda County Superior Court's decision to the same
effect under the Alameda-Contra Costa Act (which provides for "collective bargaining"
but does not mention "concerted activities") is currently on appeal. Alameda-Contra
Costa Transit Dist. v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Div. 192, 1 Civ. No. 29,201 (Ct. App.,
1st Dist., filed Dec. 15, 1970).
9. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 13080-89 (West 1969), as amended, (Supp. 1971). The
Winton Act provides for representation of employees through "certificated employee
councils" composed of representatives from employee organizations based upon
membership within the district. Id § 13085 (West Supp. 1971).
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the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act, 10 which substantially revised the
Brown Act in the direction of the private sector collective bargaining
model. The amendments, however, were made applicable only to
employees of local governments, leaving the labor relations of state
employees subject to the provisions of the original 1961 statute." In
1971 the separation between state and local employees was
formalized through the codification of applicable provisions into
separate statutes, the designation "Meyers-Milias-Brown Act" being
reserved for the statute applicable to employees of local
2
governments.
This statutory melange produces curious results. All firefighters
continue to be covered by the pre-1961 legislation; 13 in addition,
firefighters employed by local governments enjoy the protection of
the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act. 14 State firefighters, however, are
15
subject to the more primitive provisions based on the Brown Act.
Employees of a local transit district in some cases have the right to
strike,16 but city employees or employees of a municipal utility district
in the same area do not.17 A school board may recognize and bargain
with a single employee organization on behalf of its classified
employees, but if there is more than one employee organization
representing certificated employees, it must bargain with the
organizations jointly through a certificated employee council.'3 Many
of the statutory distinctions appear to be the product of ad hoc
political compromises, unsupported by any rational policy. 19
10. Cal. Stat. 1968, ch. 1390,

§§ 1-12.5, at 2725-29, as amended, CAL. GOV'T CODE

3500-11 (West Supp. 1971). The statute as amended was known
Meyers-Milias-Brown Act. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3511 (West Supp. 1971).
11. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3510 (West Supp. 1971).

as

§§
the

12. Cal. Stat. 1971, ch. 254, §§ 2-7 (West Cal. Legis. Serv.). The provisions relating to
local governments are now contained in CAL. GOV'T CODE §3 3501-10 (West 1966), as
amended (Supp. 1971); the provisions relating to state governments are regrouped at id §§
3525-36, added by Cal. Stat. 1971, ch. 254, § 6 (West Cal. Legis. Serv.).
13. See note 6 supra.
14. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3501(d) (West Supp. 1971) was amended in 1969, Cal. Stat.
1969, cl.

1269, § 1, at 2480, to include firefighters under the definition of "public

employee" for purposes of CAL. GOV'T CODE
(Supp.1971).
15. CAL. GOV'T CODE

§§

§ 3500-11 (West 1966), as amended,

3525-36, added by Cal. Stat. 1971, ch. 254, § 6 (West Cal.

Legis. Serv.).
16. See note 8 supra.
17. See text accompanying notes 176-78 infra.
18. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13085 (West Supp. 1971); See Berkeley Teachers Ass'n v.
Board of Educ. 254 Cal. App. 2d 660, 62 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1967), holding that the Winton
Act prohibits a school board from conducting an election to determine representation.
19. Cf. California Fed'n of Teachers v. Oxnard Elementary Schools, 272 Cal. App. 2d
514, 77 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1969) (upholding the Winton Act's separate treatment of public
school employees as a reasonable classification).
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A similar lack of thoughtful planning is reflected in the substance
of the individual statutes. They have grown like topsy, amendment
superimposed upon amendment without apparent attention either to
careful drafting or to the development of a coherent philosophy. This
is particularly true of the Meyers-Milias-Brown (MMB) Act, the
focus of this article. Unquestionably, the act constitutes an
improvement over the Brown Act in many ways, and it must be given
partial credit for stimulating the adoption by many local governments
of fairly progressive collective bargaining procedures and
relationships.2 0 The development is uneven, however, and in large
measure reflects the political vectors of a particular community rather
than the implementation of statutory principles. 21 In cities and
counties where labor is politically strong, patterns of recognition and
bargaining tend to approximate the model which exists in the private
sector. 22 Where labor is politically weak, the de facto situation shows
little change from before the statute.23 When questions arise as to
what may be required of a local government, or of an employee
organization, the statute provides little guidance.
The MMB Act has given rise to a considerable volume of
litigation, but there are few appellate decisions to date. In order to
determine what is happening to the statute in litigation, the author
has examined files from some eighteen cases which resulted in
opinions or orders by superior courts. While there are undoubtedly
cases which are not included, the sample is probably representative of
the problems which have reached the courts and of the ways in which
courts have attempted to grapple with them in the context of the
statutory language. An analysis of the statute in the light of the
decided cases, together with the little available legislative history and
the background of local labor relations practices, forms the substance
of this article. The article's format is as follows:

20. The best description of the act in operation is contained in the series of
publications by the Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, Berkeley,
called "California Public Employee Relations" [hereinafter cited as CAL. PUB. EMPL.
REL.J. For an early reaction by local governments to adoption of the act See Ross, The
California Experiment: Meet and Confer for A It Public Employees, CAL. PUB. EMPL.
REL. SPECIAL ISSUE I (June 1969) [hereinafter cited as Ross]. For a more recent survey
Of local implementation See Ross & DeGialluly, Implementation of the
Meyers-Milias-Brown Act by California'sCounties and Larger Cities, 8 CAL. PUB. EMPL.
REL. 6 (March 1971) [hereinafter cited as Ross and DeGialluly].
21. See generally Ross & DeGialluly, supra note 20.
22. E.g., Los ANGELES CrrY EMPLOYEE REL. ORDINANCE Nos. 141, 527,
establishing a local employee relations board, in 8 CAL. PUB. EMPL. REL. 64 (March
1971).
23. This is particularly true in the case of special districts, often remote from the
normal political process. See text accompanying notes 114-19 infra.
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I. The Preamble: Confusion Anticipated
The preamble to the MMLB Act (section 3500) states that one of
the act's purposes is to improve personnel management and
employer-employee relations in the public sector
by providing a uniform basis for recognizing the right of public
employees to join organizations of their own choice and be
represented by such organizations in their employment
relationships with public agencies .24
This tribute to uniformity is then followed by language declaring:
Nothing contained herein shall be deemed to supersede the
provisions of existing state law and the charters, ordinances, and
rules of local public agencies which establish and regulate a merit
or civil service system or which provide for other methods of
administering employer-employee relations. This chapter is
intended, instead, to strengthen merit, civil service and other
methods of administering employer-employee relations through the
establishment of uniform and orderly methods of communication
between employees and the public agencies by which they are
employed.25
The issue posed by the qualifying language in section 3500 is not
one of legislative power, for it has been held that labor relations are
matters of statewide concern, subject to governance by general law in
contravention of local regulation even by chartered cities.2 6 Rather

24. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 3500 (West Supp. 1971) (emphasis added).
25. d. (emphasis added).
26. International Ass'n of Fire Fighters v. City of Palo Alto, 60 Cal. 2d 295, 298, 348
P.2d 170, 171, 32 Cal. Rptr. 842, 843 (1963) (upholding applicability of Labor Code
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the issue is one of legislative intent-whether and to what extent the
qualifying language reflects a willingness on the part of the legislature
to permit local regulation of covered subjects. Read literally, the
language could be taken to mean that everything in the statute is
permissive only, and that nothing is binding upon any local
government which decides by charter, ordinance, or rule that it would
prefer to act in a contrary manner. But it is doubtful that legislative
permission would be necessary in order to enable a local government
to do the things which the statute permits or requires.27 Moreover, a
purely non-pre-emptive interpretation would leave a local
government free to adopt rules prohibiting employees from joining
unions, to decline recognition to any organization, and to refuse to
meet or confer with recognized organizations on matters pertaining to
employment relations-in short, to undercut the very purposes which
the act purports to serve. Such an interpretation is inconsistent with

the general objectives of the statute as declared in the preamble and
28
with the mandatory language which appears in many of the sections.
If a purely permissive interpretation must be rejected, what does the
qualifying language mean?
In general, the legislative intent behind the portion referring to
merit or civil service systems is easy enough to discern-the
legislature wanted to protect such systems to some extent (though
precisely to what extent is not clear) against generated by the emerging bargaining process.2 9 Possibly the reference to "other methods of

sections 1960-63 to a chartered city. And the definition of "public agency" in Government
Code section 3501(c) makes clear that the statute was intended to apply to every local
entity "whether incorporated or not and whether chartered or not." Cal. Stat. 1971, ch.
254, § 2 (West Cal. Legis. Serv.).
27. Obviously a local governmental body needs no statutory authority in order to
adopt a policy of protecting rights of public employees to organize, nor to accord
recognition to or enter into discussions with employee organizations. To the extent that
the act is interpreted as authorizing binding agreements otherwise precluded (See text at
note 168 infra) a permissive interpretation may be appropriate. It is noteworthy, however,
that in 1957, four years prior to adoption of the Brown Act, there were at least
twenty-three collective bargaining agreements in effect between local governments and
employee organizations in California, covering approximately 5,000 employees. See Ross
& DeGialluly, supra note 20 at 7-11.
28. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3505, 3505.1, 3505.3, 3506, 3507, 3507.3, 3508 (West
1966), as amended, (Supp. 1971).
29. It is probable that the language reflects in large measure the views of the
independent civil service-type associations, and particularly the California State
Employees Association, concerned with preservation of the civil service merit system. See
views of Walter Taylor, Attorney for CSEA, in ProceedingsThe Meyers-Milias-Brown and
Winton Acts: Major Legal Issues 48-9 (Institute of Industrial Relations, University of
California, Berkeley) (Jan. 12, 1971) [hereinafter cited as Proceedings].
The issue of the relationship between the act and civil service functions, as well as the
general issue of pre-emption, was raised in San Mateo County Employees Ass'n v. County
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administering employer-employee relations" runs in the opposite
direction: the Brown Act, in which the quoted language first
appeared, established a minimal level of communication between
employers and employee organizations, stopping short of requiring
bargaining on the private sector model. Yet, at the time of its passage,

a number of local-governments were engaging in bargaining, 30 and the
reference to "other methods" may have been intended to make clear
that the statute would not invalidate more advanced levels of

employer-organization relationships. On that basis, the quoted
language might be read as protecting those labor relations "methods"
which are consistent with, and effectuate the declared purposes of,
the statute as a whole. 31 Such in interpretation is at least consistent
with the decisions to date,32 and it will be assumed for purposes of the

of San Mateo, Civil No. 142834 (San Mateo Super. Ct., Feb. 27, 1969). Plaintiff challenged
the county's unilateral steps to contract out the operation of food departments in the
county hospital on the ground that the county was under an obligation to meet and confer
with respect to that decision. The county contended that because its charter gave the
county board of supervisors authority to hire independent contractors, reserving to the
Civil Service Commission the power "to request" that any position be filled by a civil
service appointee, state law could not apply.
It relied, in that regard, upon Pearson v. County of Los Angeles, 49 Cal. 2d 523, 319
P.2d 624 (1957). The court, in rejecting the county's argument, stated: "The Court
however Sees no conflict between the decision in Pearson and the ruling here to be made.
In fact, there is support for the Court's determination by reason of the following statement
in Pearson: 'It is settled that local rules or regulations as to matters which a county is
constitutionally empowered to regulate by charter supersede general State laws on the
subject, except as to matters of statewide concern where the State has occupiedthe field.'
"It is the opinion of this Court that with respect to the proceduralstandards of public
employee-public employer relations the State has now occupied the field." (emphasis
partially added). Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Temporary Injunction, Feb.
27, 1969, at 4.
30. Ross, supra note 20, at 7-11.
31. Section 3502 protects also the right of employees to "represent themselves
individually in their employment relations with the public agency." CAL. GOV'T CODE §
3502 (West 1966).
32. The only appellate decision which has discussed the issue is itself nearly as cryptic
as the statute, In Ball v. City of Coachella, 252 Cal. App. 2d 136, 60 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1967),
a police chief claimed he had been dismissed for union activity in violation of the Brown
Act. The court rejected the city's argument for local control based on the qualifying
language in section 3500 by saying: "The argument is without merit. The quoted provision
was obviously included to avoid any possible construction that the statute was intended to
supplant any existing civil service system, merit plan, or other local regulations dealing
with employer-employee relations." Id at 143, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 143. Interpretation of the
case is complicated by the fact that at the time of dismissal section 3508 of the act
authorized a public agency, acting by resolution or ordinance, to prohibit law enforcement
officers under certain circumstances from joining employee organizations "where it is in
the public interest to do so." Cal. Stat. 1961, ch. 1964, § 1, at 4143, as amended, CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 3508 (West Supp. 1971). The court conceded that the city could have
precluded union activities by the police chief if it had acted pursuant to formal rule. 252
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ensuing discussion.

II. Organizational Rights of Employees
Section 3502 of the Government Code states that public
employees have the right (and the right to refuse)
to form, join, and participate in the activities of employee
organizations of their own choosing for the purpose
33 of
representation on all matters of employer-employee relations.

Section 3506 declares
organizations shall not

that

public

agencies

and

employee

interfere with, intimidate, restrain, coerce or discriminate against
public employees because of their exercise of their rights under
Section 3502.34

The protection accorded by these sections is qualified for
specified categories of employees. 35 Section 3507.5 provides that local
public agencies may adopt rules preventing management and
confidential employees from serving in a representative capacity for
an employee organization which includes other employees, but the
section does not otherwise limit the right of such employees to be
members of and to hold office in an employee organization. 36 Section
3508 presently provides 37 that the governing body of a public agency

may, in accordance with "reasonable standards," limit or prohibit the
right of law enforcement officers to form, join or participate in

Cal. App. 2d at 142 n.2, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 142 n.2. Thus, the court's reference to "other local
regulations dealing with employer-employee relations" may have been intended to refer
to that possibility. However, other portions of the opinion suggest strongly that in the
absence of an enabling provision such as then contained in section 3508 a public agency
could not limit the activities protected by section 3502. Indeed, section 3508 itself
provided that: "The right of employees to form, join, and participate in the activities of
employee organizations shall not be restricted by a public agency on any grounds other
than those set forth in this section." After the dismissal of Ball, section 3508 was amended
to the effect that full time peace officers could not be prohibited from joining
organizations composed entirely of peace officers. Cal. Stat. 1965, ch. 285, § 1, at 1286. See
text accompanying notes 37-40 infra.
33. Id
34. Id. § 3506.
35. Referring to both Government Code sections 3500-09 and Labor Code sections
1960-63, the California Supreme Court has stated: "The total effect of all this legislation
was ... to create uniform fair labor practices throughout the state." Professional Fire
Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 276, 294-95, 384 P.2d 158, 169, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 830,841 (1963).
36. See text accompanying notes 89-93 infra for discussion of bargaining units for
supervisors. The last sentence of section 3507.5, precluding limitation of the right to join
and hold office, was added in 1969. See Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 1389, § 1, at 2834.
37. See note 32 supra. The term "peace officer" is defined in CAL. PENAL CODE § 830
(West 1970).
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employee organizations "where it is in the public interest to do S0."38
The same section provides that "peace officers" may not be

prevented from joining or participating in autonomous employee
organizations composed solely of peace officers, and that the right of
employees to form, join, and participate in the activities of employee
organizations shall not be restricted "on any grounds other than those

set forth in this section." 39 Only a few local governments have
adopted restrictive rules pursuant to section 3508.40

There are certain differences in language between sections 3502
and 3506 and analogous sections of the Labor Management Relations

Act (LMRA). 41 Unlike section 7 of the federal act, for example,

section 3502 speaks in terms of "representation" rather than
"collective bargaining." It omits the federal reference to "concerted
activities." In connection with the right of employees to refrain from
engaging in organizational activities, the state act omits the federal

proviso which expressly permits union shop agreements. 42 The
significance of those differences will be discussed later in this article.
Minor differences notwithstanding section 3502 follows the

federal model at least with respect to the right to affiliate, and section
3506 is broader in scope than the comparable LMRA provisions since
it picks up the language of both sections 8(a)(1) 43 and (3) 44 of the
federal act and adds the word "intimidate" for good measure. A
reasonable conclusion, therefore, is that the two sections taken

together were designed to prohibit not only such obvious forms of
union discrimination as discharge for union membership but also,
more

subtle

forms

of

interference

such

as

interrogation,4 5

38. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3508 (West Supp. 1971).
39. Id.
40. The Ross & DeGialluly survey, supra note 20, at 10-14, 16-20, shows only three
counties and five of the 36 cities over 75,000 in population having adopted such provisions.
41. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1970).
42. Id. § 157 provides: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from
any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as
authorized in section 158 (a) (3) of this title."
43. Id. § 158(a) (1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to threaten,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their section 157 rights.
44. Id. § 158(a) (3) makes it an unfair labor practice to encourage or discourage union
activity by discrimination in employment.
45. Questioning of employees concerning union membership or activities is lawful or
unlawful according to its justification and its likely effect upon employees. The NLRB
currently holds that polling of employees as to union affiliation or support is unlawful
unless (1) its purpose is to determine the truth of a union's claim of majority status; (2) this
purpose is communicated to employees; (3) assurances against reprisals are given; (4) the
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surveillance, 46 and threats or promises of reward which may have
chilling effects upon union organizational efforts. 47 The prohibition
against interference would, in accord with federal precedent, preclude
rules which unreasonably restrict
even neutrally motivated
48
efforts.
organizational
The similarity which the MMB Act bears to the LMRA in its
substantive provisions is lost when it comes to procedure; while the

federal act provides an administrative tribunal for interpretation and
effectuation of the protected interests, 49 the only remedy for violation

of the state act is through the courts. This procedure is normally more
costly and time consuming than agency procedure. 50 Its cumbersome
nature tends to make difficult the effective protection of employee

rights. Moreover, judges seldom have the labor relations experience
necessary to evaluate the many subtleties in unfair labor practice
cases. Courts are also ill-equipped to perform the conciliatory
function by which agencies such as the NLRB frequently bring about
polling is in secret ballot; and (5) no other coercive atmosphere exists. Struksnes Constr.
Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1967).
46. Deliberate surveillance of union activities by management representatives is
unlawful per se under the LMRA. See, e.g., Dal-Tex Optical Co., 152 N.L.R.B. 1317
(1965).
47. Section 8(c) of the LMRA, the so-called "free speech" provision, denies protection
to speech which "contains... threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit." 29 U.S.C. §
158(c) (1970); cf. Dal-Tex Optical Co., 152 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1965).
48. Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
Reliance by state courts on federal precedent for interpretation of sections 3502 and
3506 finds support in International Ass'n of Fire Fighters v. County of Merced, 204 Cal.
App. 2d 387, 22 Cal. Rptr. 270 (1962), where the court stated: "In view of the fact that the
provisions of section 1962 of the Labor Code are in part identical with the provisions of
section 7 of the federal Labor Management Relations Act, the construction placed upon
the language [of section 7] by the United States Supreme Court is helpful in determining
the connotation of that language as used in our Labor Code." Id. at 392, 22 Cal. Rptr. at
274.
In Ball v. City of Coachella, 252 Cal. App. 2d 136, 60 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1967), involving
application of Government Code section 3506, the court referred to the Fire Fighters case
with approval and commented that the language of section 3506 appears "stronger and
more explicit" than language of Labor Code section 1962.
49. 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-56 (1970).
50. An alternative to a state court suit for the protection of organizational rights under
the MMB Act, and one that offers some hope in terms of litigation costs for the winning
party, is suit in federal court under the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. See 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). That statute has been held applicable to union discrimination on the
ground that the right to join and participate in the activities of labor unions is part of the
right of association protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. E.g.,
American Fed'n of State, County, & Municipal Employees v. Woodward, 406 F.2d 137
(8th Cir. 1969); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968). Punitive damages are
available in such a suit, at the discretion of the trier of fact. Lee v. Southern Home Sites
Corp., 429 F.2d 290, 294 (5th Cir. 1970) (a real estate corporation refused to sell a lot to a
Negro). Still, the procedure is a poor substitute for administrative enforcement.
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voluntary compliance, and they may be reluctant to provide the kinds
of remedies, such as posting of notices, which often perform a
valuable function in labor relations matters. California, in failing to
provide administrative enforcement machinery, lags behind both the
federal government and most states.
IMl. Recognition
A logical description of any statutory system of industrial
relations should start by asking who is supposed to bargain with
whom. As a practical matter, the answer may be more significant than
what the law says they bargain about, or how they bargain, or what
they do with the bargain once it is made. Bargaining structure is
bound to have substantial effect upon what happens in the bargaining
process no matter what the law may say. Unfortunately, it is precisely
at this recognition stage that the MMB Act begins to bog down.
A. Systems of Recognition

The crux of the recognition problem is plain enough: the
legislature has from the outset been ambivalent regarding the
applicability of the private sector model to the public sphere. The
private sector model contemplates bargaining in good faith between
an employer and a union designated by a majority of employees
within an appropriate unit as their bargaining representative. If doubt
exists concerning the union's status, it is typically resolved through an
election. If a dispute exists concerning the appropriateness of a
particular unit, it is settled by an impartial administrative agency.
Once selected by a majority, a union acts as exclusive bargaining
representative for all employees within the unit, whether they are
members or not. Individual employees may represent themselves in
grievance matters, but only if the resolution of the grievance is
consistent with the collective bargaining agreement. 51
Clearly, the legislature did not adopt the private sector model in
the Brown Act.52 That statute eschewed the term "bargaining," and
51. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 101(a), 29 U.S.C, § 159(a)
(1970).
52. The legislative history of the act makes the rejection clear. The legislature had
before it two bills, one sponsored by the California Labor Federation (AFL-CIO) calling
for a system of collective bargaining on the private sector model, Cal. A.B. 2375 (1961),
and the other sponsored by the CSEA, calling also for negotiation in good faith with
majority representatives but providing unit rules strongly favoring large units, and
therefore association-type organizations. Cal. A.B. 2045 (1961). Each organization
opposed the other's proposal, and both were opposed by the League of California Cities,
which favored local determination. The result was a compromise pleasing no one in
particular. See Ross, supra note 20, at 3-4. It has been suggested that the act made it
through the legislature precisely because it was ambiguous. Id at 21.
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spoke only of the obligation of public employer to
meet and confer with representatives of employee organizations
upon request, and [to] consider as fully as it deems reasonable such
presentations as are made by the employee organization on behalf
prior to arriving at a determination of policy or
of its members 53
course of action.
The language primarily connotes a duty to listen to each employee
organization "on behalf of its members. '54 The term "employee
organization" was defined generally to include any organization
having agency employees as members and having as one of its
primary purposes the representation of such members in
employer-employee relations.5 5 Hence, an agency presumably had a
duty to meet and confer with as many organizations as its various
employees might wish to join.
In the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act amendments of 1968, however,
56
the legislature moved markedly closer to the private sector model.
53. Cal. Stat. 1961, ch. 1964, at 4142.
54. To the same effect was CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3503 (West Supp. 1971), which spoke
of the right of employee organizations "to represent their members in their employment
relations with public agencies."
55. On the issue of "primary purpose," an organization's constitution and bylaws have
been held not to control. California School Employees Ass'n v. Willits Unified School
Dist., 243 Cal. App. 2d 776, 779-80, 52 Cal. Rptr. 765, 766-67 (1966) (decided under the
Winton Act which contains similar language).
56. This is not to imply that the legislature has adopted the private sector model for all
purposes. On the contrary, the act is closer to what the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) calls a "meet and confer" approach rather than a

"collective negotiations" approach.

ACIR REPORT ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT POLICIES

FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1969). The "meet and confer" laws, according to

the commission are "generally less comprehensive," they usually treat questions of
representation, administrative machinery, dispute settlement, and unfair practices "more
superficially," and they "usually accord a different status-a superior one-to the public
employer vis-a-vis employee organization." Id. In May 1970, the ACIR drafted a
comprehensive model meet-and-confer bill and an alternate bargaining bill. These bills are
reprinted in 51 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. 211, 215. A California appellate court in
California Fed'n of Teachers v. Oxnard Elementary School, 272 Cal. App. 2d 514, 523, 77
Cal. Rptr. 497, 506 (1969) commented: "Although the Brown Act was amended in 1968...
to require that the governing body of a public agency should 'meet and confer in good
faith' and should reduce its employment agreements to writing... only the Los Angeles
Metropolitan Transit Authority Act... has adopted and applied to employees in public
service in California the collective bargaining concepts of the National Labor Relations
Act or similar state statutes."
Such generalized observations are not particularly helpful in deciding particular
issues, however. The definition of good faith bargaining under federal law, for example, is
in terms of the duty to "meet and confer in good faith." See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
Moreover, the ACIR itself concedes there are many variations in "meet and confer type
statutes. ACIR REPORT, supra. This article assumes that the meaning of California's
legislation is to be found in its language and in the court decisions which have interpreted
it, rather than in such a general characterization. For a more recent study and
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The duty to meet and confer became the duty to meet and confer "in
good faith"; 57 the definition of the revised commandment made clear

that the goal of the process was not simply communication but

agreement.5 8 The terms of an agreement were to be incorporated in a
written memorandum,5 9 and employees were to receive time off from

work to engage in the meet-and-confer process. 60 Public agencies
were not to take legislative action on matters affecting employment
relations without giving written notice. 61 In the event of disagreement

in the meet-and-confer process, mediation was authorized. 62 In short,
and at the risk of some over simplification, what had been a duty to
recommendations, avoiding such characterizations See "Pickets at City Hall"--Report and
Recommendations of the Twentieth Century Task Force on Labor Disputes in Public
Employment (1970), in 51 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. 151.

57. The 1968 amendments are based on two parallel bills, Assembly Bill 1182 and
Senate Bill 1228. In their original form, both bills called for a public employer to
"negotiate in good faith" with employee organizations, but the senate bill contained no
definition of that term, and the assembly bill simply provided that the duty included the
right of an employee organization "to be informed" on matters within the scope of
representation and to receive reasonable notice of proposed agency action. As the bills
moved through the legislature, they were amended to retain the "meet and confer"
language but added the words "in good faith" and the current definition of the revised
terminology. The senate bill, as amended, was enacted into law. Cal. Stat. 1968, ch. 1390, §
6, at 2727, codified at CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3505 (West Supp. 1971).
58. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3505 (West Supp. 1971) provides in pertinent part: "'Meet
and confer in good faith' means that a public agency, or such representatives as it may
designate, and representatives of recognized employee organizations, shall have the
mutual obligation personally to meet and confer within a reasonable period of time in
order to exchange freely information, opinions, and proposals, and to endeavor to reach
agreement on matters within the scope of representation."
59. Id. § 3505.1. "If agreement is reached by the representatives of the public agency
and a recognized employee organization or recognized employee organizations, they shall
jointly prepare a written memorandum of such understanding, which shall not be binding,
and present it to the governing body or its statutory representative for determination."
60. 1& § 3505.3. "Public agencies shall allow a reasonable number of public agency
employee representatives of recognized employee organizations reasonable time off
without loss of compensation or other benefits when formally meeting and conferring with
representatives of the public agency on matters within the scope of representation."
61. Id. § 3504.5. "Except in cases of emergency as provided in this section, the
governing body of a public agency, and boards and commissions designated by law or by
such governing body, shall give reasonable written notice to each recognized employee
organization affected of any ordinance, rule, resolution, or regulation directly relating to
matters within the scope of representation proposed to be adopted by the governing body
or such boards and commissions and shall give such recognized employee organization the
opportunity to meet with the governing body or such boards and commissions."
62. Id. § 3505.2. "If after a reasonable period of time, representatives of the public
agency and the recognized employee organization fail to reach agreement, the public
agency and the recognized employee organization or recognized employee organizations
together may agree upon the appointment of a mediator mutually agreeable to the parties.
Costs of mediation shall be divided one-half to the public agency and one-half to the
recognized employee organization or recognized employee organizations."
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listen became a duty to bargain.
But bargain with whom? Not, according to the 1968
amendments, with every "employee organization" as the Brown Act
required, but only with a "recognized employee organization." The
duty to meet and confer in good faith runs only to (and from)
recognized employee organizations. Only such organizations are
entitled to notice of proposed policy changes; only their
representatives must be given time off for the meet-and-confer
process; the statute's provisions relating to mediation apply only to
their disputes. All that remains, then, is to determine the procedure
and conditions in accordance with which recognition is to be granted
or withheld.
Under the act, section 3501(b) defines a "recognized" employee
organization as
an employee organization which has been formally acknowledged
by the public agency as an employee
organization that represents
63
employees of the public agency.
Thus, the public agency accords recognition, and it does so through a
process called "formal acknowledgment," a term which is not defined.
Conceivably, the section helps determine when an employee
organization has been recognized within the meaning of the statute. A
superior court has held, for example, that although the city of Los
Angeles granted "informal recognition" to various organizations
shortly after passage of the MMB Act, the organizations were not
entitled to meet-and-confer rights until adoption of an implementing
ordinance since the process of formal acknowledgment had not taken
place. 64 The section provides no help in determining the conditions, if
any, under which the statute requires recognition to be granted or
withheld-no help, that is, unless the section were interpreted to
mean that any employee organization which represents employees of
the public agency must be recognized.
This view, that the statute requires adoption of a general
recognition policy, was expressed by the legislative counsel in an
opinion which issued while the MMB Act amendments were awaiting
gubernatorial signature in 1968.65 Moreover, Assemblyman Milias,
one of the bill's co-sponsors, recorded apparent agreement with the

63. Cal. Stat. 1971, ch. 254, § 2 (West Cal. Legis. Serv.).
64. Los Angeles Fire & Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles, Civ. No.
955544 (Los Angeles Super. Ct., Aug. 26, 1969). Cf. Local 829, American Fed'n of State,
County, & Municipal Employees v. County of San Mateo, No. 156541 (San Mateo Super.
Ct., Oct. 30, 1970) (mem.), holding, in effect, that the county was estopped from denying
recognition to union with which it continued to negotiate after adoption of the act.
65. Opinion of Legislative CounselNo. 15526 in 1968 JOURNAL OF THE CALIFORNIA
ASSEMBLY, Reg. Sess. 7080.
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legislative counsel's position. 66 Support for that position may be found
in section 3502, which protects the right of employees to be

represented by organizations "of their own choosing," and in section
3503 which declares the right of recognized employee organizations to
represent "their members" in their employment relations with public
agencies. If the latter section means a recognized organization may
represent its members only, then a general recognition policy would
provide recognition for all employees without coercing membership
into a particular organization.
But sections 3502 and 3503 were subject to. less restrictive

interpretations, 67 and the 1968 amendments run counter to the
legislative counsel's view. Addition of the word "recognized" to the

term "employee organization" itself implied selectivity in extension of
meet-and-confer rights.68 Section 3507, which provides that a public
agency may adopt "reasonable rules and regulations" for
administration of employer-employee relations and lists various
matters which may be included, was amended in 1968 by addition to
that list of "provisions for recognition." If it were intended that
recognition should follow automatically upon proof that an
organization represents some members of a public agency, it is not
likely that rules and regulations would be necessary. Finally, the
66. Letter from Assemblyman Milias to Assemblyman Karabian, Aug. 2, 1968,
reprinted in 1968 JOURNAL OF THE CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY Reg. Sess. 7083-84. The
letter not only expresses agreement with the legislative counsel's position but also
purports to accept the quite different views contained in a letter by Assemblyman
Karabian, Le., indicating that it was his understanding that the bill required recognition of
organizations based upon historical representation of a particular class and type of
employee and that incumbent organizations should be recognized. For a more recent, and
still different, expression of intent by Assemblyman Milias See note 73 infra.
67. Assuming the right to "participate" in employee organizations "of their own
choosing" included the right to be represented by such organizations, the phrase "of their
own choosing" is adapted from the LMRA where, of course, it connotes choice by a
majority of employees through democratic procedures. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 158 (1970).
The difficulties posed by the language of section 3503 could be resolved either by
interpreting the word "members" to include members of the bargaining unit, or by reading
that section not as a limitation on the scope of representation, but as a minimum standard
which may be exceeded by local government through local rules.
68. It is arguable that the word "recognized" was added simply to enable local
governments to adopt procedures for determining whether an organization qualifies as an
"employee organization" within the meaning of section 3501(a). However, they had the
right under section 3507, even before the 1968 amendment, to adopt rules for "verifying
that an organization does in fact represent employees of the public agency, so the only
additional function rules could serve within the ambit of section 3501 (a) would be to
verify that an organization has representation of such employees "as one of its primary
purposes." Assuming, arguendo, that the "primary purpose" test calls for the exercise of
judgment on the part of the public agency, it seems unlikely that the legislature would
have resorted to such a cumbersome way of stating that the public agency may adopt rules
on that subject as well.
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general thrust of the amendments was in the opposite direction. To
require a public agency to meet and confer in good faith, as that
phrase is currently defined, with every organization which can prove
it has members within the agency and to extend to all such
organizations the privileges ancillary to recognition is simply not
feasible for large public employers. Such a requirement would place
too great a burden upon the public agency; it would foster rivalry and
dissension among organizations; and, by making negotiations more
complex and agreement more difficult, it would tend to frustrate the
stated objectives of the statute. 69 Meeting and conferring in the MMB
Act sense could not effectively take place in such a framework.
Even prior to the 1968 amendments several cities and counties
had implemented a policy of according recognition on the basis of
majority representation within appropriate units.70 Most local
governments which adopted recognition procedures in response to
those amendments did so in the form of "differential recognition"
systems, according formal recognition (with meet-and-confer rights)
to majority-designated organizations and informal recognition (with
the right of "consultation" only) to othersY In 1969 Los Angeles
County's differential recognition system was upheld in the courts
72
against an attack based in part on the legislative counsel's theory,
7
3
and the validity of such systems has since been generally assumed.
69. See Schneider, Unit Determination:Experiments in CaliforniaLocal Government, 3
CAL. PUB. EMP. REL. 8-9 (1969). It is perhaps a reflection of such concern that the League
of California Cities, in its proposed model ordinance, rejects the general recognition
approach in favor of a majority choice system.
70. Ross & DeGialluly, supra note 20, at 7-11.
71. Id at 10-11. The League of California Cities model ordinance provided such a
system. 1 CAL. PUB. EMP. REL. B-2, B-3 (1969). The differential system in effect accords
minority organizations Brown Act-type rights.
72. Los Angeles County Employees Ass'n v. County of Los Angeles, Civ. No. 939557
(Los Angeles Super. Ct., Feb. 20, 1969). The suit was brought by the Los Angeles County
Employees Association on the ground, among others, that the majority representation
provisions of the ordinance (Los ANGELES, CAL. ORDINANCE No. 9646, adopted Sept. 3,
1968) conflicted with the act. The superior court initially granted a preliminary injunction
against implementation of the ordinance (Oct. 2, 1968), but after trial the court rendered
judgment for defendants, and the court of appeals declined to issue a writ of supersedeas.
See 1 CAL. PUB. EMP. REL. B-1 (1969). A subsequent merger between the association and
a union mooted the issue.
73. See, e.g., Sacramento County Employees Organization v. County of Sacramento,
Civ. No. 213728 (Sacramento Super. Ct., Memorandum and Order Denying Preliminary
Injunction, Aug. 23, 1971). The case involved the validity of an exclusive dues checkoff.
See text accompanying notes 130-34 infra. In upholding the validity of such a system, the
court stated: "[A]part from the right of individuals to represent themselves, Gov't Code
Sections 3502,3503, the county may act as if the 'recognized employee organizations' were
the exclusive bargaining agents or representatives." Id. at 1. Assemblyman Milias, who
earlier expressed approval of the legislative counsel's interpretation, see note 66 supra,
stated in August of 1970, at a conference sponsored by the U.C.L.A. Institute of Industrial
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At the same time, many public agencies appear to have been
under the impression that to grant "exclusive" recognition to a
majority organization, without reserving consultation rights to other
organizations, would violate the act.74 The legal foundation for that
belief is doubtful, since the only express rights a nonrecognized
organization has under the act is the right to consult with respect to
adoption of rules under section 3507. If sections 3502 and 3503
authorize
limitation
of
meet-and-confer
rights
to
a
majority-designated organization, it should make no difference under
the act whether other organizations do or do not have the right to
consult. In any event, that issue has been resolved by the 1971
legislature which amended section 3507 to authorize provision for:
exclusive recognition of employee organizations formally
recognized pursuant to a vote of the employees of the agency or an
appropriate unit thereof, subject to the right of an employee to
represent himself as provided in Section 3502(e) .... 75
Whether the 1971 amendment 76 to section 3507 uses the term "exclusive" in the narrow sense described in the preceding paragraph, or
whether it uses the term in a broader sense to include any system
which accords meet-and-confer rights on an exclusive basis is unclear.
In either event, the amendment retains the former authorization for
public agencies to adopt rules pertaining to "recognition of employee
organizations," 77 so it is apparent that "exclusive recognition,"
whatever that term may mean, is not the only permissible form. A
differential system, whether or not embraced within the amendment,
should therefore continue to be valid. While it is arguable, on grounds
considered above, 78 that a general recognition system is not
compatible with the aims of the current statute, it is unlikely, given
the act's legislative history and ambiguous language, that a court
would hold such a system to be impermissible per se.
The 1971 amendment makes clear that exclusive recognition is to
be accorded "pursuant to a vote of the employees. ' 79 Whether or not
a differential system is considered to be exclusive, the statutory right
Relations on the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act of 1968: "We intended that this section (3501
(a)) would allow any type of recognition that the governing agency chose to implement
after conferring with all employee groups. We did not preclude exclusive recognition,
mutual recognition, majority recognition, or any other combination you wish to consider."
74. See, e.g., 1 CAL PUB. EMPL. REL. A-12 (1969).
75. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3507, addedby Cal. Stat. 1971, ch. 1575, § 1 (West Cal. Legis.

Serv.).
76. See id.
77. Compare CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3507 (West Supp. 1971) with Cal. Stat. 1971, ch.
1575, § I (West Cal. Legis. Serv.).
78. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
79. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3507, added by Cal. Stat. 1971, ch. 1575, § 1 (West Cal. Legis.
Serv.).
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of employees to be represented by organizations "of their own
choosing" would seem to rule out criteria other than employee choice
as a basis for selective recognition. The provisions of section 3507
invite judicial scrutiny into the reasonableness with which that
criterion is implemented.
B. Adoption of Rules

Section 3507, in dealing with the adoption of rules by public
agencies, uses permissive language, and several trial courts have
expressed the opinion, though mainly in dicta, that an agency is free
to adopt or not to adopt rules as it chooses.80 Section 3507 also
requires that rules be "reasonable" and, since the 1968 amendments,
that employee organizations be consulted prior to their adoption. A
purely permissive reading of section 3507 would produce the

anomalous result that an agency could implement unreasonable
policies without consultation so long as it did so on an ad hoc basis.
Moreover, the absence of formal rules tends to frustrate the
legislative policy, expressed in the 1970 amendment, that employee

80. E.g., Orange County Employees Ass'n v. City of Anaheim, Civ. No. M-1606
(Orange County Super. Ct., Feb. 26, 1971). The county, without benefit of rules,
recognized Service and Maintenance Employees Union, Local 399, as representative for a
unit of 600 part-time and 30 full-time employees at the city's sports and convention center.
The Anaheim Municipal Employees Association, claiming 16 of the full-time employees as
members, sought an injunction to restrain the city from recognizing or bargaining with
Local 399 with respect to those 16 individuals, on the ground that the act permits each
employee to designate his own representative. In a supplemental points and authorities
memorandum filed with the court, the plaintiffs made the additional argument that at least
in the absence of rules regarding units and representation, the city's action in according
exclusive recognition to Local 399 was improper. In denying a preliminary injunction, the
court stated: "[T]he act is very clear that the political body in question may or may not
adopt rules to implement the act." Reporter's Transcript, Feb. 26, 1971, at 2. The court
went on to suggest that rules be adopted "to prevent a reoccurrence of what we have
here." Id at 3.
To the same effect is Los Angeles Fire & Protective League v. City of Los Angeles,
Civ. No. 955544 (Los Angeles Super. Ct., Aug. 26, 1969), in which the plaintiff sought to
compel the city to meet and confer on a variety of matters. The city bad previously
granted all employee organizations only "informal recognition." The court denied relief,
holding that the city would owe the duty to meet and confer only if it "formally
acknowledged" the league.
It is significant that Cal. A.B. 498 (1970), the bill underlying the 1970 amendment of
section 3507 and requiring that recognition not unreasonably be withheld, was sponsored
by the California State Firemen's Association. See note 81 infra. The court in California
Fed'n of Teamsters v. Oxnard Elementary Schools, 272 Cal. App. 2d 514,77 Cal. Rptr. 497
(1969), suggested one of the differences between the Winton Act and the Brown Act was
that the former "makes it compulsory, rather than discretionary, for the public agency
governing board to formulate rules relative to employment relations." Id. at 529, 77 Cal.
Rptr. at 510.

April 1999]

PUBLIC EMPLOYEE BARGAINING

organizations not be denied recognition unreasonably. 81 In the
absence of rules, an employee organization cannot know clearly what
it must do in order to obtain recognition, and the courts are likely to
have difficulty in measuring the agency's acts against the legislative
standard. Thus, the potential for arbitrary or discriminatory action,
with concomitant chilling effects upon employee organizations, would
be enhanced.
The legislative counsel in his 1968 opinion on the MNB Act
predicted that courts would overlook the permissive wording of
section 3507 and make rule-making mandatory.82 No court has yet
squarely fulfilled that prediction, but one superior court has suggested
a compromise position: the adoption of rules is optional, in the sense
that an agency cannot be ordered to adopt them, but a failure to
adopt rules renders any restrictions upon recognition "unreasonable"
within the meaning of the act. Therefore, in the absence of rules an
agency must recognize any employee organization that requests
recognition.83 The result, although somewhat arbitrary, does convey a
81. A consultant to the Senate Industrial Relations Committee, in an analysis of A.B.
498 (the 1970 amendment to Government Code Section 3507), stated: "If this bill were to
become law, and a public agency failed to adopt such rules and regulations as it is allowed
to promulgate under section 3507 of the Government Code, then questions pertaining to
formal recognition of employee organizations necessarily would be answered without the
benefit of any predetermined agency standards or guidelines.
"The apparent practical effect of the bill would be to force a public agency to adopt
rules and regulations to verify that an organization does in fact represent employees of the
public agency. In any event, recognition of an employee organization could not be
unreasonably withheld by any public agency as defined in Sec. 3501(c) of the Government
Code." Consultant's Analysis of A.B. 498 for the Senate Industrial Relations Comm.
(Mar. 13, 1970), on file at Hastings Law Journal.
82. Opinion of Legislative Counsel, supra note 55. It is noteworthy that in 1967 a
measure, Cal. A.B. 2381 (1967), was introduced expressly permitting public agencies to
adopt rules on such matters as impasse resolving and bargaining units; and the bill was
dropped in the senate on the apparent basis of a legislative counsel opinion that the bill
would not create rights not already enjoyed by local governments. The motion to drop and
the opinion appear consecutively at 1967 JOURNAL OF THE CALIFORNIA SENATE, Reg.

Sess. 4041-43.
83. American Fed'n of State, County and Municipal Employees, Local 1675 v. City of
Oakland, No. 417229, consolidated with Sovulweski v. City of Oakland, No. 417135
(Alameda Super. Ct., Nov. 9, 1971). An election was conducted pursuant to rules which
had been proposed but not formally adopted. The court ruled the election invalid. Its
decision rested in part upon a resolution previously adopted by the city council and
contemplating the adoption of rules and regulations before an election was conducted, and
in part upon the view that any restrictions upon recognition are unreasonable without
rules having been established through the meet and confer procedure; and the court's
opinion concluded by saying: "To allow such an election to stand would violate the
dictates of Section 3507 in that it would constitute an unreasonable withholding of
recognition of employee organizations." Ruling on Application for Preliminary Injunction,
Nov. 8, 1971.
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certain sense of Solomonic justice.
C. Unit Determination

Unit determinations are as critical to the bargaining process as
districting is to the political process. Such determinations affect not
only the number but also the character of the organizations which
represent an agency's employees. The definition of units may
determine, for example, such matters as whether traditional civil
service employees associations gain or lose strength in comparison to
unions, whether craft unions gain or lose strength in comparison to
unions seeking to represent employees on departmental or
cross-departmental bases, and the like. The procedure by which such
decisions are made, and the criteria brought to bear upon the
decisions, are among the most significant factors in any industrial
relations system.
Concerning the criteria for unit determination, the MMB Act,
characteristically, sheds little light. The only explicit criteria are
contained in section 3508, 4 which authorizes rules requiring not only
separate units but separate organizations for peace officers, and
section 3507.3, which provides that professional employees may not
be denied the right to be represented separately from nonprofessional
employees and by a professional employee organization.
Section 3507.3 gives rise to several questions. It defines the term
"professional employees" in general terms but illustrates the
definition by examples which imply a rather limited category of
college trained personnel. 85 An attempt to include licensed vocational
nurses and psychiatric technicians among the explicit examples was
adopted by the 1970 legislature but vetoed by the governor,86 and
disputes over application of the present language have given rise to
considerable litigation.87
A second issue under section 3507.3 is whether professional
84. See notes 26-32 supra.
85. Section 3507.3 provides: "'Professional employees'... means employees engaged
in work requiring specialized knowledge and skills attained through completion of a
recognized course of instruction, including, but not limited to, attorneys, physicians,
registered nurses, engineers, architects, teachers, and the various types of physical,
chemical, and biological scientists." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3507.3 (West Supp. 1971).
86. FINAL CALENDAR OF LEGISLATIVE BUSINESS 428 (1970); see Cal. A.B. 1285

(1970).
87. E.g., California Licensed Vocational Nurses, Inc. v. Sequoia Hosp. Dist., No.
141277 (San Mateo Super. Ct., filed June 4, 1971); Licensed Vocational Nurses League of
California, Inc. v. County of Sacramento, No. 207379 (Sacramento Super. Ct., filed Nov.
25, 1970). Both were unsuccessful attempts to obtain judicial endorsement of licensed
vocational nurses as "professionals." Western Council of Eng'rs v. County of Santa Clara,
No. 249039 (Santa Clara Super. Ct., Apr. 27, 1971), holding that engineers were entitled to
representation in a unit separate from nonprofessional employees.
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employees have the right to be represented separately in a unit

limited to their own profession, or whether they may be included,
against their will, in a unit consisting of more than one professional

group. A superior88court in Alameda County has ruled in favor of the
latter alternative.
Finally, section 3507.3 leaves unclear whether the right of

professional employees to separate representation may be waived by
majority vote, as under federal principles, or whether it is a right
running to each individual employee. If the MMB Act permits a
system of representation based upon majority choice, it would seem
that the federal analogy should control.
The act appears to extend representation rights to supervisory
and managerial employees without regard to their position in the

administrative hierarchy 89 -a highly questionable proposition to

begin with in view of the inevitable conflicts of interest involved. 90 To

make matters worse, nothing is said about their unit placement. Most
local

governments

have

excluded

employees

designated

as

"management" from units altogether, 91 so far apparently without
challenge, and have established separate units for supervisors above
the first-line level. 92 Supervisory units are, however, in many cases
represented by employee93 organizations which also represent
nonsupervisory employees.

88. Alameda County Ass't Pub. Defenders Ass'n v. County of Alameda, No. 412309
(Alameda Super. Ct., May 21, 1971). The board of supervisors had established a county
wide residual unit consisting of approximately 360 nonhealth-related professional
employees in a variety of professions. Organizations representing engineers and public
defenders claimed the unit violated section 3507.3. Held: "Under the provision of
Government Code Section 3507.3 attorneys and engineers have a right to be represented
separately from non-professional employees, but they do not have a right to be
represented separately from other professional employees." Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, Alameda County Ass't Pub. Defenders Ass'n v. County of Alameda,
supra. But see Western Council of Eng'rs v. County of Santa Clara, No. 249039 (Santa
Clara Super. Ct., Apr. 27, 1971) where the issue posed and decided by the court's
memorandum of opinion was whether engineers were entitled to representation in a unit
separate from nonprofessional employees. The findings of fact and conclusions of law,
however, state a conclusion opposite to that reached in the Alameda County case. See
Opinion of the Legislative Counsel No. 1546 (Jan. 28, 1970), to the effect that it would be
consistent with section 3507.3 and applicable law to allow professions to be separately
represented.
89. This result follows from the broad definition of "public employee" in section
3501(d), excluding only elected officials and those appointed by the governor. It is
contrary to the situation under the LMRA, which excludes supervisory and management
personnel from the definition of "employee." See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970).
90. See Reith & Rosen, Problemsin Representationof Supervisors,8 CAL. PUB. EMPL.
REL. 1 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Reith & Rosen].
91. Id. at 3. See also Ross & DeGialluly, supra note 20.
92. Reith & Rosen, supra note 90, at 3.
93. Id.
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With respect to unit determinations generally, the statute
establishes no criteria. Local practice has varied from the application
of fairly detailed guidelines 94 to ad hoc determinations based upon no
identifiable standards. 95 In such a situation the only basis for judicial
review has been the vague standard of "reasonableness" expressed in
section 3507.96 One court applying that standard found that a county
ordinance establishing a single unit for the county's 600 employees,
without permitting lesser units no matter what the showing, was
invalid upon the ground (among others) that it had a deterrent effect
upon organization by nonincumbent groups. 97
The 1971 "exclusive recognition" amendment to section 3507
uses the term "appropriate unit," arguably inviting reference to
standards of appropriateness established elsewhere in the private and
public sectors. It also refers, however, to a vote of employees "of the
agency or an appropriate unit thereof," suggesting that exclusive
recognition may be accorded on an agency wide basis without regard
to whether lesser units would be appropriate. Such a result may be
avoided by reading the phrase "or an appropriate unit thereof to
require the establishment of lesser units where, in accordance with
generally accepted criteria, they can be shown to be appropriate. But,
the statutory guidance is vague indeed, and the vagueness is
compounded by the unsuitability of the judicial process to the task of
review.
The principal defect in the statutory provisions pertaining to
94. E.g., Los ANGELES COUNTY, CAL. ORDINANCE 9646, § 8(b), Sept. 1968,
providing for the following six criteria:
"(1) Which unit will assure employees the fullest freedom in the exercise of rights
granted under this [o]rdinance.
"(2) The community of interest of the employees.
"(3) The history of employee relations in the unit, among other employees of the
County, and in similar public employment.
"(4) The effect of the unit on the efficient operation of the public service and sound
employee relations.
"(5) Whether management officials at the level of the unit have the power to agree or
make effective recommendations to other administrative authority or the Board of
Supervisors with respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment
subject to negotiations.
"(6) The effect on the existing classification structure of dividing a single classification
among two or more units."
95. See, e.g., Ross & DeGialluly, supra note 20.
96. Arguably a flagrant departure from generally accepted criteria would be
unreasonable. See generally Schneider, supranote 69.

97. Operating Eng'rs, Local 3 v. Board of Supervisors, No. 16501 (Madera Super. Ct.,
Dec. 30, 1970), 75 L.R.R.M. 2598 (granting writ of mandate). The effect of the opinion is
clouded by the court's reliance upon the fact that in its view the applicable ordinance
provided for "legislative persuasion" rather than "collective bargaining" and it
distinguished the Los Angeles case on that ground.
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matters of unit determination, however, is its lack of some neutral
procedure for establishment of units in the first instance. 98 With or
without statutory guidance on criteria, a procedure which leaves unit
determination to the governing body of each agency or an agency
official is seen by many employee organizations to be, and may in
practice be, unfair. The governing body, after all, often has a vested
interest, as employer, in the outcome. Moreover, disputes over the
establishment of units may subject the governing body to political
pressures it would prefer to avoid. Some local governments have
recognized these problems and established neutral or relatively
neutral procedures by ordinance. The system in the city of Los
Angeles is the most elaborate, providing for a five-man local
employee relations board. 99 The System in the County of Sacramento
is the most simple, providing for determination by a neutral
arbitrator. 1°° Both are exceptions to the general practice.
A 1971 addition to the statute improves the situation somewhat.
Section 3507.1 provides:
In the absence of local procedures for resolving disputes on the
appropriateness of a unit of representation, upon the request of any
of the parties, the dispute shall be submitted to the Department of
Industrial Relations for1mediation or for recommendation for the
resolving of the dispute. 01
The new section comes into play, however, only in the absence of
local procedures. It does not require that local procedures conform to
any particular standards of neutrality; it does not provide for any
review of determinations reached through local procedures; and it
does not result in any binding decision.
Courts could determine, under the current statutory provisions,
that any system of unit determination which fails to provide for

98. Under the LMRA, of course, unit disputes are determined by the National Labor
Relations Board. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970). Under the federal executive order pertaining
to bargaining by federal employees, they are determined by an assistant secretary of labor.
Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 6, 3 C.F.R. 513 (1971). Of the 18 states which require bargaining
with government employees, California is the only state which fails to provide for some
form of determination or review by a state agency. Schneider, supra note 69. See Grodin
& Hardin, Public Employee Bargainingin Oregon,--ORE. L. REV. -(1972).
99. Los ANGELES CITY, CAL. ORDINANCE 141,527, Jan. 29, 1971, reprintedin 8 CAL.
PUB. EMPL. REL. 64 (1971). Section 4.810(a) provides that the board is composed of five
members appointed by the mayor. Ia at 65. When vacancies occur, the position is filled
from a list of three nominees prepared jointly by the Advisory Management Council of the
city, and a committee composed of representatives of currently qualified employee
organizations. Id § 4.810(c), 8 CAL. PUB. EMPL. REL. 65-66.
100. Units were determined for the county pursuant to decision by Arbitrator Morris
Myers on May 3, 1971. 10 CAL. PUB. EMPL. REL. 9 (1971).
101. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3507, added by Cal. Stat. 1971, ch. 1575, § 1 (West Cal. Legis.
Serv.).
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neutral determination in the event of dispute is at least presumptively
invalid, but ultimately there must be standards of neutrality
established on a statewide basis and administered by a statewide
agency. This does not mean that a statewide agency should make all
unit determinations for local governments. Conceivably some local
governments would wish to utilize the services of the state agency
rather than procedures, but it would be undesirable and, at this point,
unworkable to attempt a uniform state unit determination system. A
state agency could, however, review local determination procedures
to assure elemental fairness and compliance with statutory
procedures and criteria. 102
D. Selection of Majority Representatives

Among local governments which grant recognition on a selective
basis, there exists a broad range of established criteria and procedures
for determining the selection of majority representatives. Apparently,
some local governments do not even accept the principle of majority
employee choice as the governing criterion.103 However, most accept
this principle but apply it in different ways. A few provide for
recognition based on petition, records, or cards alone, 1°4 but the
overwhelming majority provide for election by secret ballot in the

102. New York's Taylor Act, N.Y. CIV. SERv. LAW §§ 200-14 (McKinney Supp. 1971),
empowers local governments to establish representation procedures in accordance with
statutory criteria. Id. § 206. These criteria include:
"1. define the appropriate employer-employee negotiating unit taking into account
the following standards:
"(a) the definition of the unit shall correspond to a community of interest among the
employees to be included in the unit;
"(b) the officials of government at the level of the unit shall have the power to agree,
or to make effective recommendations to other administrative authority or the legislative
body with respect to, the terms and conditions of employment... and
"(c) the unit shall be compatible with the joint responsibilities of the public employer
and public employees to serve the public.
"2. ascertain the public employees' choice of employee organization as their
representative.., on the basis of dues deduction authorization and other evidence, or, if
necessary, by conducting an election.
"3. certify or recognize an employee organization upon (a) the determination that
such organization represents that group of public employees ... and (b) the
affirmation.., that it does not assert the right to strike ....
IL § 207. See King, The
I"
Taylor Act-Experiment in Public Employer-Employee Relations, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1
(1968); McHugh, New York's Experiment in Public Employee Relations: The Public
Employees' FairEmployment Act, 32 ALBANY L. REv. 58 (1967).
103. See notes 104-08 & accompanying text infra.
104. This procedure is used mainly in smaller cities and counties. See Ross &
DeGialluly, supra note 20. It is not clear what is supposed to happen in the event of a
challenge. See note 98 supra.
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event of challenge 0 5 Moreover, among local governments which
provide some election procedure, the majority rule principle is
applied variously. Some permit recognition based on a majority of the
valid votes cast (the federal method); 10 6 others insist upon a majority
of employees within the unit,10 7 or a majority in an election in which a
specified percentage of eligible voters participate. 10 8
The current language of section 3507, referring to a "vote of the
employees" as the basis for according exclusive recognition, casts
doubt upon the validity of those local procedures which rely upon
card check or petition to determine majority status. To view such
methods as a form of "voting" would be-to distort ordinary usage.
Procedures established under differential recognition systems could
be regarded as exempt from the requirements of section 3507 if
"exclusive recognition" were given a narrow interpretation. However,
why the legislature would insist upon a vote to establish exclusive
recognition and allow other methods of according meet-and-confer
rights to in majority organizations under circumstances in which
minority organizations have the right of "consultation" is not at all
clear.
Even if the new language were held not to apply to differential
systems, sections 3502 and 3506 would seem to require that any
system of selective recognition utilize a procedure reasonably
calculated to determine employee choice in a manner which does not
unreasonably interfere with protected rights. By those standards an
election is certainly the most appropriate technique. A case can be
made for the use of authorization cards or petitions under
circumstances in which there is no substantial challenge to majority
status or where, as under federal law principles, an election has been
held but set aside on the basis of interference with free choice. 0 9 It is
difficult to defend the use of such procedures otherwise." 0 In any
event, a requirement that an organization demonstrate its
representative status through petitions or cards ought not to be
upheld where the organization objects to disclosure of names and

105. E.g., the Alameda County ordinance provides that if a petition for representation
is filed containing the signatures of a majority of employees within the unit, and no
challenging petition is filed within thirty days from notice thereof, the petitioning
organization is certified. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, CAL., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE ch. 7, §§

7-9.05 to .06 (1971).
106. E.g., id.
107. E.g., the City of Glendale. See Ross & DeGialluly, supra note 20.
108. E.g., County of Contra Costa (50%); City of San Jose (60%). Ross & DeGialluly,
supranote 20.
109. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
110. Mai
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there can be no effective guarantee of anonymity."'
Where an election is held, it follows from the same standards that
it should be conducted by secret ballot. An atmosphere free from coercion should be a condition to its validity." 2 Whether local rules may
113
require something more than a majority of votes cast is debatable.
Section 3507 remains silent with respect to such issues, providing only
that exclusive recognition may be revoked by majority vote only after
a twelve month period.
Much of this is unfamiliar territory to most judges, however, and
to expect meaningful judicial supervision over the selection
procedures under the current statute is probably unrealistic. In what
the author considers an extreme case (not surprisingly since the
author was a participant) an irrigation district declined two union
alternatives for recognition, one on the basis of authorization cards to
be shown to a neutral party and another by an election to be
conducted by a neutral party. After first questioning and insisting
14
upon proof of the union's "jurisdiction" to represent its employees
and deferring consideration of the union's request for several
months,115 the district ended up recognizing an "independent"
association which had represented its employees in past years. In
explaining its actions, the district contended there was no reason to
have two organizations representing its employees, the association
was better able than the union to perform that function, and the
association had majority support." 6 The conclusion as to majority
status was based upon a conversation between the district manager
and two supervisors in which the supervisors reported that most of
the employees whom they had talked to preferred the association to
the union. 117 The evidence was both flimsy and improper-flimsy in
the sense that it was unreliable on the question of majority choice and
improper in the sense that it involved interrogation of employees
concerning union affiliation or sympathies. Nevertheless, a superior
111. See NLRB v. New Era Die Co., 118 F.2d 500, 504 (3d Cir. 1941) (To have shown
cards to the employer as requested "would have been to deprive the employees of their
secrecy of choice which the Act is designed to secure.").
112. Dal-Tex Optical Co., 152 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1965).
113. The NLRB originally required a majority of all unit employees. In re Chrysler
Corp., 1 N.L.R.B. 164, 170 (1936). However, the rule was quickly changed. See In re
R.C.A. Mfg. Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 159,176 (1936).
114. Electrical Workers, Local 1245 v. Fresno Irrigation Dist., No. 145472 (Fresno
Super. Ct., July 29, 1970), appealdocketed, Civ. No. 1666 (Ct. App., 5th Dist., filed Dec. 1,
1971).
115. The union's request for recognition was made January 23, 1970, and denied June 5,
1970.
116. Opening Brief for Appellant at 10, Electrical Workers, Local 1245 v. Fresno
Irrigation Dist., Civ. No. 1666 (Ct. App., 5th Dist., filed Dec. 1. 1971).
117. Ild. at 12.
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court upheld the district's
determination on the ground that it was
"not unreasonable.' ' 18 The case is currently on appeal. 119
In the area of representation procedures, as in the area of
machinery for protection of organizational rights, California is
woefully behind the federal government and nearly all other states.
The initial executive order establishing collective bargaining for
federal employees provided for levels of recognition, 120 but the new
order provides for exclusive recognition based on majority
representation within appropriate units. 121 Disputes over units are
determined by the assistant secretary of labor for labor-management
relations in accordance with specified criteria 122 and recognition is
accorded only on the basis of elections by secret ballot.'23 State
legislation, while subject to some variation, follows a similar
pattern.12 4 With the exception of Alaska, whose statute simply
authorizes labor contracts,125 California is the only state which fails to
establish procedures for determining recognition.
118. Notice of Intended Decision at 4, July 15, 1971, Electrical Workers, Local 1245 v.
Fresno Irrigation Dist., No. 145472 (Fresno Super. Ct., July 29, 1971).
119. Appeal Docketed, Civ. No. 1666 (Ct. App., 5th Dist., filed Dec. 1, 1971).
120. Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1964). Executive Order No. 10,988
provided for formal, or exclusive, recognition to majority unions and informal recognition,
with consultation rights, to minority unions. The Federal Labor Relations Study
Committee, created to study experience under the order, reported as follows concerning
those provisions: "Informal recognition was originally intended to serve as a transitional
feature in order not to disrupt existing relationships with small union groups in the early,
developmental phases of the program. Reported experience with this form of recognition
indicates that while a small number of unions still find it to be a useful tool, a substantial
number of both union and agency officials believe it has outlived its usefulness.
"In general, union experience has shown that it detracts from the dignity and prestige
of exclusive recognition ....
Agency experience also has been largely on the negative side.
Federal management officials have found that informal recognition is no longer
meaningful; that it encourages fragmentation, creates overlapping relationships, and
places an undue administrative burden on management; and that unions with such
recognition lack the strength to contribute substantially to stable labor relations....
"Its continuance, therefore, is no longer appropriate in a program that has reached a
high level of exconclusive [sic] negotiation." Report and Recommendations on LaborManagement Relations in the FederalService, 21 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. 1013,1015.
121. Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 10, 3 C.F.R. 510,515 (1970). Unions may also be granted
"national consultation rights" at the agency level. LL § 9,3 C.F.R. at 515.
122. "A unit may be established on a plant or installation, craft, functional, or other
basis which will ensure a clear and identifiable community of interest among the
employees concerned and will promote effective dealings and efficiency of agency
operations. A unit shall not be established solely on the basis of the extent to which
employees in the proposed unit have organized ....
" Management officials, supervisors,
and guards are excluded from units established after the adoption of the new order, and
professional employees are guaranteed a right to separate units. Id § 10, 3 C.F.R. at 515.
123. Id § 10(a), 3 C.F.R. at 515.
124. See Seidman, supranote 2.
125. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.010 (1962).
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IV. Union Security and Dues Checkoff
Since section 3502 of the act protects the right of employees "to
refuse to join or participate in the activities of employee
organizations," and since, unlike the LMRA, the act contains no
exemption from that protection in favor of union security agreements,
to require an employee to belong to a particular employee
organization as a condition of his employment would violate the act.
Whether the same is true of a requirement that an employee pay an
agency or service fee to an employee organization which has been
selected by a majority of employees within an appropriate unit as
their repfesentative under the act is not so clear. While a union shop
and an agency shop are legal equivalents under federal law,126 some
states distinguish between them for purpose of applying a state
right-to-work law. 127 If a public agency, on the basis of majority
choice, recognizes a single organization as representative of
employees within a unit for purposes of meeting-and-conferring, then
presumably that organization owes all employees within the unit a
duty of fair representation. 28 This is the basis for justifying the claim
to financial support from all employees. Arguably, to require the
employee organization to carry "free riders" by prohibiting the
agency shop would be inequitable. Therefore, to ascribe such an
intent to the legislature is unreasonable in the absence of clear
language of prohibition. The words "join" and "participate" in section
3502 need not be interpreted-to "include the
payment of a service
129
fee by an employee within a represented unit.
126. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734,744 (1963).
127. See Grodin & Beeson, State Right-to-Work Laws and Federal Labor Policy, 52
CALIF. L. REV. 95 (1964).
128. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192,202 (1944). "The duties of a bargaining
agent selected under the terms of the Act extend beyond the mere representation of the
interests of its own groups members. By its selection as bargaining representative, it has
become the agent of all the employees, charged with the responsibility of representing
their interests fairly and impartially. Otherwise, employees who are not members of a
selected union at the time it is chosen by the majority would be left without adequate
representation." Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248,255-56 (1944).
129. Support for this view may be found in the 1970 rejection of Senate Bill No. 719
which would have amended the second sentence of section 3502 to read: "Public
employees also have the right to refuse to join or participate in the activities of employee
organizations, including the payment of any type of dues, fees, assessments, or service fees
of any type, and shall have the right to represent themselves individually in their
employment relations with the public agency." The bill was defeated in committee.
FINAL CALENDAR OF LEGISLATIVE BUSINESS 203 (1970). The Legislative Counsel,

however, had previously expressed the view that an agency shop clause would "make
meaningless the right of employees not to join employee organizations." Opinion No.
12613 (June 24, 1969). It is arguable, therefore, that the committee considered the bill to
be redundant.
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The courts have not had occasion to pass upon the validity of the
agency shop, but a related issue involving exclusive check-off of dues
has been litigated. The employee relations ordinances in a number of
cities and counties provide for deduction of dues only from the
payroll of members of the recognized employee organization in each
unit.130 As a result, other employee organizations which may have
members within the unit must collect dues on an individual basis. In
the county of Sacramento, the county employee organization and
Local 22 of the Service Employees International Union sued to enjoin
implementation of such a rule on the ground that the Government
131
Code which provides for dues deductions for public employees,'
does not permit discriminatory treatment.1 32 They relied on Renken
v. Compton City School District 133 in which the court of appeal ruled
the Government Code invalidated a resolution of a local school board
allowing deductions in favor of a particular organization if a minimum
of 50 percent of the employees eligible for membership in that
organization gave signed approval. But the trial court, in a well
reasoned opinion, distinguished Renken as involving an arbitrary
classification of organizations in terms of size without regard to
function. Under the MMB Act, the court reasoned, the county may
treat recognized employee organizations as exclusive bargaining
agents, and on that basis there exists a functional difference between
those and other organizations which justified deduction of dues for
the benefit of the one and not the others.M

130. Ross & DeGialluly, supra note 20.
131. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 1157.1, 1157.3 to .5 (West Supp. 1971). Section 1157.1
provides: "Employees of a public agency... may authorize deductions to be made from
their salaries or wages for the payment of dues in ... any bona fide association (a) whose
members are comprised exclusively of the employees of such public agency, or (b) whose
members are comprised exclusively of the employees of such public agency and one or
more other public agencies the payrolls of which are prepared by the same finance
officer...."
132. Sacramento County Employees Organ. v. County of Sacramento, No. 213728
(Sacramento Super. Ct., Aug. 23, 1971).
133. 207 Cal. App. 2d 106, 24 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1962). But see California State Employees'
Ass'n v. Regents of the University of California, 267 Cal. App. 2d 667, 73 Cal. Rptr. 449
(1968) (University of California employees not state employees within the meaning of
sections 1150 through 1157.5).
134. Sacramento County Employees Organ. v. County of Sacramento, No. 213728
(Sacramento Super. Ct., Aug. 23,1971) (denying preliminary injunction).
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V. Meeting and Conferring
A. The Scope of Representation
Section 3505 establishes the mutual obligation of public
employers and employee organizations to meet and confer in good
faith regarding "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment" and defines the phrase "meet and confer in good faith"
in terms of the obligation to bargain and attempt to reach agreement
"on matters within the scope of representation." Section 3504 defines
that term to include
and
relating
to employment
conditions
all matters
employer-employee relations, including, but not limited to, wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, except,
however, that the scope of representation shall not include
of any service
consideration of the merits, necessity, or organization
135
or activity provided by law or executive order.

The phrase "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment" is taken verbatim from the LMRA, 136 where it has been
given a generous interpretation, including almost anything that might
affect an employee in his employment relationship. 137 The phrasing of
the first part of section 3504 suggests the scope of representation
under the MMB Act is even more broad, though it is difficult to

imagine how that would be possible. In any event, state courts have
given it a broad interpretation. The bargaining obligation has been
held to extend to such matters as: the privilege of police captains to

use city automobiles after working hours, 138 the contracting-out of
food services for a county hospital, 139 a city's decision-to move
toward coverage of city employees under the state retirement
system, 140 and the interpretation of an ordinance relating to salary

135. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3504 (West Supp. 1971).
136. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
137. The term "wages" has been held to include all emoluments of value to employees.
Richfield Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 717, 724 (D.C. Cir. 1956). The term "conditions"
includes actions of the employer affecting job tenure. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v.
NLRB, 379 U.S. 203,210 (1964).
138. Oakland Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Oakland, No. 406059 (Alameda Super.
Ct., Nov. 25, 1971) (enjoining unilateral discontinuance of this practice which allowed use
of vehicles).
139. San Mateo County Employee's Ass'n v. County of San Mateo, No. 142834 (San
Mateo Super. Ct., Feb. 27, 1969) (granting temporary injunction against unilateral action
on the ground that it would affect hours and working conditions).
140. Van Fleet v. City of Oakland, No. 403056 (Alameda Super. Ct., Aug. 28, 1971)
(requiring the city to cease giving effect to individual waivers, or determining voting units
for pension elections unilaterally, or unilaterally determine policy with respect to pension
matters).
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setting.'41

One California state court decision 142 follows federal precedent

in extending the scope of representation beyond meet-and-confer
sessions to the representation of individual employees on grievance
matters as well. The city of Oakland maintained an employee
evaluation system whereby employees were evaluated periodically by

their immediate supervisor, with right of appeal to a reviewing
supervisor. The outcome of the evaluations was reflected in the
employee's personnel record, where it could affect such matters as

discipline or promotion. The superior court in Alameda County ruled
that employees were entitled under the act to have their union
representative present at the reviewing supervisor level since the
matter was one affecting terms and conditions of employment. 143 A

superior court in Los Angeles, on the other hand, arrived at a
contrary result in a case involving the desire of a college professor to
be represented by his employee organization in a grievance involving
denial of his tenure; it held the professor had no right to such
representation under the act.44
The effect of the latter portion of section 3504, which excepts
from the scope of representation consideration of the "merits,

necessity or organization of any service or activity provided by law or
executive order," has not been determined. The language was added
as part of the 1968 amendments-presumably as a protection against
the expanded concept of bargaining which those amendments
embraced-but its meaning is far from clear. 45 Unions rarely wish to
141. San Luis Obispo County Employees Ass'n v. Freeman, No. 38265 (San Luis
Obispo Super. Ct., May 5, 1971).
142. Electrical Workers, Local 1245 v. City of Oakland, No. 398967 (Alameda Super.
Ct., June 18,1971).
143. Id. The same superior court by a different judge, ruled that employers could not
insist upon union representation at an ad hoc meeting called by administrative officials to
inquire into reports that some employers had used county vehicles for other than official
business; and that they could, therefore, be disciplined for their refusal to attend on that
basis. Social Workers Local 535 v. Alameda County Welfare Dep't No. 390290 (Alameda
Super. Ct., Aug. 17, 1970). The case is distinguishable on the basis of the ad hoc
investigatory nature of the meeting. The IBEW case involved a more formal appellate
review from adverse action already taken.
144. CSEA v. Trustees of the California State Colleges, No. 998263 (Los Angeles
Super. Ct., Jul. 8, 1971). See 10 CAL. PUB. EMPL. REL. 22 (1971). Since the case involved a
state employee, however, the 1968 Meyers-Milias-Brown Act amendments did not apply.
145. According to Walter Taylor, attorney for the California State Employee's
Association, the qualifying language was inserted as a result of a conference with the
Governor on Senate Bill 1228, which became the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act: "The
Governor did not want employees to negotiate on matters that had to do with
organization or mission. And you hear the ringing down across the years, because he said
then, as he says now, he didn't want 'those social workers negotiating with the welfare
people on the level of benefits to the clients .....
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bargain over the merits or necessity of a service or activity, but they
may wish to bargain over such matters as lines of supervision or
assignment of personnel, or workload. These matters could be
regarded as going to questions of "organization. '146 Perhaps the
limiting language should be read as applying only where the
organization of the service or activity is itself determined by law; the
"And so [I]was sent out to do some drafting. And I came back with those words
'except, however.... ' And the Governor said: 'Well, with that in the Bill, I will sign it sign
it ....
'
"So we marched back over to Senate Finance. And it was one of those occasions, you
know, where the Committees go until late at night. I think it was about 11:00 o'clock at
night by the time they called up S.B. 1228.
"Now, this is how laws get passed. Laws are not always passed through the wisdom of
the legislators." Proceedings,supra note 22, at 50-51.
The Los Angeles County Employee Relations Commission has ruled that, under the
terms of that county's ordinance, the county was obligated to negotiate with a union on
the subject of caseloads for eligibility workers employed by the Department of Public
Social Services. The county argued, inter alia, that a provision of the ordinance entitled
"County Rights," granting the county the "exclusive right.., to determine the mission of
each of its constituent departments... set standards of services to be offered to the public,
and exercise control and discretion over its organization and operations," exempted the
subject matter from the scope of bargaining. The commission, relying upon legislative
history to show that the phrase "conditions of employment" in the ordinance provision
relating to the scope of bargaining was intended to include such a subject, concluded that
the specific definition of the scope of bargaining governed the more general language of
the "County Rights" clause. It relied upon federal precedents but did not discuss the
Meyers-Milias-Brown Act. In re Joint Council Los Angeles County Employees Ass'n,
reported in 11 CAL. PUB. EMPL. REL. 49 (1971).
The meaning of the section 3504 exclusion clause is presently being litigated in the
city of Vallejo, whose charter provides for compulsory and binding arbitration of
negotiation disputes. See note 184 infra. The city is contending that manning schedules for
firefighters is a matter of "organization" exempt from the meet-and-confer process and,
therefore, exempt from arbitration. Firefighters Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo, Civ. No.
53187 (Solano Super. Ct., filed Dec. 22, 1971).
146. The original executive order pertaining to bargaining by federal employees
excluded from the scope of bargaining "such areas of discretion and policy as the mission
of an agency, its budget, its organization and the assignment of its personnel, or the
technology of performing its work." Exec. Order No. 10,988 § 6(b), 3 C.F.R. 521, 522
(1964). The language gave rise to considerable confusion, the phrase "assignment of
personnel" having been interpreted by some as excluding bargaining over assignment of
employees to overtime or shifts. "This clearly was not the intent of the language. This
language should be considered as applying to an agency's right to establish staffing
patterns for its organization and the accomplishment of its work.., the number of
employees in the agency and the number, type, and grades of positions or employees
assigned in the various segments of its organization and to work projects and tours of
duty." Report of the Labor Relations Study Committee, 21 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. 10, 11
(1966). The new order (effective January 1, 1970) contains that clarification, as well as a
statement that the reference to "technology" does not preclude bargaining over
appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected by the impact of realignment
of work forces or technological change. Exec. Order No. 11,491, §11(b), 3 C.F.R. 451, 458
(1970).
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reference to "executive order" could have little application to local
government.
B. The Duty to Meet and Confer in Good Faith

The MMB Act's definition of the core duty to meet and confer in
good faith closely follows the LMRA definition of good faith

bargaining. 147 It makes clear that the duty is not satisfied by an
exchange of correspondence. Instead, representatives of the public
agency and employee organization must meet and confer "person.
ally" 148 to "exchange freely information, opinions, and proposals,"
and most significantly, that they are "to endeavor to reach agreement
on matters within the scope of representation.' 149 Section 3505 was
amended in 1970 to provide that the parties were to meet and confer
"within a reasonable period of time,"1 50 leaving to interpretation
whether that meant they were to start their meetings within a
reasonable period of time after request, or were to conduct them for a
reasonable period after commencement, or both. As a result of 1971
amendments, the section now provides that the parties win meet and
confer "promptly upon request by either party and continue for a
reasonable period of time," including adequate time for impasse
147. Compare CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3505 (West Supp. 1971), with 29 U.S.C. §158(d)
(1970).
Section 3505 provides: "'Meet and confer in good faith' means that a public agency, or
such representatives as it may designate, and representatives of recognized employee
organizations, shall have the mutual obligation personally to meet and confer within a
reasonable period of time in order to exchange freely information, opinions, and
proposals, and to endeavor to reach agreement on matters within the scope of
representation."
Section 158(d) provides: "For the purposes of this section, to bargaincollectively is the
performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement,
or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating
any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession ....(emphasis
added).
148. In San Joaquin County Employee Ass'n v. County of San Joaquin, No. 102482
(San Joaquin Super. Ct., Sept. 3, 1970) the court held that the Board of Supervisors was
not required to participate in meet-and-confer process. The ruling is supported by the fact
that in 1968, concurrent with the adoption of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act, the legislature
amended the Ralph Brown Act (requiring public bodies to hold public meetings) to
permit executive sessions involving dealings with employee organizations over salaries,
schedules or compensation. Cal. Stat. 1968, ch. 1272, § 2, at 2397, codified in CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 54957.6 (West Supp. 1971). The amendment thus enables governing bodies to
meet privately with management representatives without becoming directly involved in
the process.
149. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3505 (West Supp. 1971).
150. Cal. Stat. 1970, ch. 727, § 1, at 1355.
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resolution procedures provided or agreed upon.151 Agreement, when

reached, is to be reduced to a written memorandum of understanding
and presented to the governing body for determination. 152 Section
3505.3 fortifies the process by requiring public agencies53 to allow
employees reasonable time off for meeting and conferring.

Presumably certain types of conduct-for example, a refusal by
either party to meet, or to make proposals, or to respond to proposals
with argument, or to exchange information reasonably relevant to the
bargaining process-will be regarded as per se violations of the MMB
Act, as they are of federal law.' 54 Far more difficult to deal with are

claims of bad faith based upon evaluation of particular bargaining
positions or tactics. The federal system has enough difficulty
attempting to distinguish between "hard bargaining" on one hand and
the sort of attitude or tactics deemed incompatible with a desire to

reach a negotiated agreement on the other.155 The difficulty is
compounded under the MMB Act which places the burden of such

determination entirely upon the courts. Courts confronted with such
claims will tend 56to react negatively, as indeed they have in the
litigation to date.

151. Cal. Stat. 1971, ch. 1676, § 1, at 3965.
152. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3505.1 (West Supp. 1971).
153. Id § 3505.3. See Confederacion de la Raza Unida v. City of San Jose, No. 247184
(Santa Clara Super. Ct., Jan. 13, 1971), denying preliminary injunction sought by a group
of taxpayers to enjoin the city from allowing a police officer time off for police association
business. See 8 CAL. PUB. EMPL. REL. 63 (1971).
154. The language of section 3505 appears to incorporate the duty of employers under
federal law, derived from the good faith bargaining obligation to furnish a union with
information which it needs in order to bargain intelligently. See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co.,
351 U.S. 149 (1956) (financial ability to grant a wage increase, where employer has made
that an issue); Texaco, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 142 (1968) (evaluation data); Sylvania Elec.
Prods., Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. 1756 (1965) (health and welfare information).
155. See NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736, 756 (2d Cir. 1969) (sustaining the
NLRB in holding that an employees overall bargaining stance, including a
take-it-or-leave-it approach, constitutes bad faith bargaining).
156. E.g., Santa Cruz City Civil Serv. Ass'n v. City of Santa Cruz, No. 44234 (Santa
Cruz Super. Ct., July 9, 1970), where plaintiff complained that the city's negotiating team
met with the city council in "secret session" and agreed to place a dollar limit on increases,
and subsequently adhered to that position without making any counter-offers. The court
denied relief. Similarly, in San Joaquin City Employees Ass'n v. San Joaquin City, No.
104282 (San Joaquin Super. Ct., Sept. 3, 1970), plaintiff complained that bad faith
"whipsawing" tactics were involved when the county's negotiating team made certain
proposals and then turned negotiations over to the Civil Service Commission which
reduced the last offer of the negotiating team. The matter was then referred to the board
of supervisors, which made offers more liberal than the commission's Position but not as
liberal as that of the negotiating team. The court denied relief. See 7 CAL. PUB. EMPL.
REL. 37. And in Sacramento Fire Fighters Union v. City of Sacramento, No. 206076
(Sacramento Super. Ct., Oct. 19,1970), 75 L.R.R.M. 2509 (1970), the Sacramento superior
court rejected a claim that bargaining on the basis of an asserted predetermined 6%
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The Ban on Unilateral Action

The reluctance of courts to intervene when the claim is subjective

bad faith in bargaining disappears when a. public agency has taken
unilateral action without bargaining at all. In such situations, courts
have been quite zealous in condemning the unilateral action and in
granting appropriate relief. For example, in San Mateo County
Employee's Ass'n v. County of San Mateo, a superior court found the
proposed contracting-out of cafeteria services fell within the scope of
representation under the act and issued a temporary injunction
prohibiting the county from opening and declaring any bids by
proposed contractors until the meet-and-confer obligations were
met. 157 Another court found the use by police captains of city
automobiles to be a bargainable matter and enjoined the city from
unilaterally restricting their use pending bargaining.158 A third court
determined that the transfer from a city to the state pension system
was subject to bargaining and issued a similar order. 59
The statutory basis for such relief is characteristically ambiguous.
The proposition that the duty to bargain implies, without the
necessity for express provision, an obligation not to act unilaterally on
a matter within the scope of bargaining has become an accepted part
of federal law.16° The right of employees to representation has little
meaning if an employer may circumvent the process through a fait
accompli. The California legislature was not content to let the matter
rest with implication. When section 3505 was amended in 1968 to
require meeting and conferring in good faith, the legislature retained
from the Brown Act the additional obligation on the part of a public
agency to "consider fully such presentations as are made by the
employee organization on behalf of its members prior to arriving at a
determination of policy or course of action.' 6' If the duty to meet
and confer itself implies a ban on unilateral action, what is the import
of this explicit obligation, phrased in terms more passive than the
definition of meeting-and-conferring?
Perhaps the quoted language can be explained by reading
"consider fully" as if it meant "meet-and-confer until an impasse has
been reached." However, no such explanation is available for section
3504.5 of the act added to the statute in 1968. Under this section,
when a governing body of a public agency or a board or commission
ceiling was in bad faith.
157. No. 142834 (San Mateo Super. Ct., Feb. 27, 1969).
158. Oakland Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Oakland, No. 406059 (Alameda Super.
Ct., Nov. 25, 1970).
159. See note 140 supra.
160. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
161. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3505 (West Supp. 1971).
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proposed to adopt an "ordinance, rule, resolution or regulation
directly relating to matters within the scope of representation" it must
give recognized employee organizations notice and the opportunity
"to meet" with the governing body.
In several cases, public agencies have argued that a particular
matter falls within section 3504.5 rather than section 3505, and,
therefore, an opportunity to appear before the governing body, rather
than an opportunity to meet and confer, is all that is required. One
court has suggested drawing a line between "legislative acts," to
which section 3504.5 is applicable, and "administrative acts," to which
the more stringent requirements of section 3505 apply. 162 The case
was found not to involve a legislative act, and so the court held
section 3505 to be applicable. However, the converse cannot be true
in all cases. Plainly an employee organization is not precluded from
bargaining over wages, for example, simply because action on wages
takes the form of a salary ordinance. Another court has held that
section 3504.5 rather than section 3505, applies to a city council's
decision to submit to referendum certain proposed changes in the
prevailing wage provisions of the city charter. 163 A city employees'
association contended the city should "meet and confer" regarding
the proposed referendum, but the court held to the contrary. The
court apparently accepted the city's rationale that the action
contemplated was of a "general nature, applying to employees
generally" as opposed to "more specific matters, such as wages and
hours for specific classes of employees," on which bargaining is
required. 164
Both courts assumed that sections 3504.5 and 3505 are mutually
exclusive, imposing different standards applicable to different types of
governmental action. That assumption is compelled neither by
statutory language nor by legislative history. Section 3504.5 applies to
actions "directly relating to matters within the scope of
representation," and section 3505 requires meeting and conferring on
"matters within the scope of representation." The language hardly
suggests distinct categories. Meeting with the city council or a board
of supervisors was an established form of communication between
employee organizations, particularly independent associations, and
local public agencies in prebargaining days. 165 Possibly, the legislature
162. Oakland Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Oakland, No. 406059 (Alameda Super.
Ct., Nov. 25, 1971).
163. Sacramento City Employees Ass'n v. City of Sacramento, No. 205314 (Sacramento
Super. Ct., Sept. 21, 1970).
164. See Points and Authorities and Declarations in Opposition to Application for
Issuance of Preliminary Injunction for Defendant at 3, Sacramento City Employees Ass'n
v. City of Sacramento, No. 205314 (Sacramento Super. Ct., Sept. 21,1970).
165. Ross, supra note 20.
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wished to preserve that form of communication as to some matters on
which meeting and conferring had taken place. Once again, however,
it is apparent that legislative clarification is required.

VI. Agreements and Their Enforcement
The NIMB Act says nothing about enforceable agreements
between a public agency and an employee organization. Parties in the
meet-and-confer process are to endeavor to reach agreement, and if
they succeed, the terms of agreement are to be incorporated in a
jointly prepared written memorandum of understanding. However,
the statute states categorically that the memorandum is to be nonbinding.' 66 The memorandum is to be presented to the governing
body or its statutory representative "for determination," but the
statute is silent with respect to the alternative forms of determination
or their legal effect. If, for example, the governing body proceeds to
incorporate the terms of the memorandum in an ordinance, the
ordinance is itself enforceable.1 67 But what if it merely, or at least
preliminarily, adopts or ratifies the memorandum by resolution? Has
it then entered into an enforceable agreement?
Notwithstanding the lack of explicit statutory authority, the
courts have uniformly held that a memorandum of understanding,
once adopted by the governing body of a public agency, becomes a
binding For agreement. or example, superior courts have issued writs
of mandamus to compel compliance with memoranda provisions
68
relating to a city's obligation to replace worn-out police vehicles,
and to a city's promise to conduct a joint salary survey and implement
its results in accordance with a state formula. 169 An appellate court
has stated the proposition even more broadly:
[W]hen a public employer engages in [meetings pursuant to the
duty to meet and confer] with the representatives of the public
employee organization, any agreement that the public agency is
enter into, should be held
authorized to make and, in fact, does
valid and binding as to all parties .... 170
166. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3505.1 (West Supp. 1971).
167. Los Angeles Fire & Police Protection v. City of Los Angeles, Civ. No. 960664 (Los
Angeles Super. Ct., filed Sept. 8, 1969).
168. San Jose Peace Officers Ass'n v. City of San Jose, No. 254096 (Santa Clara Super.
Ct., June 6, 1971).
169. Glendale City Employees' Ass'n v. City of Glendale, No. 988444 (Los Angeles
Super. Ct., July 14, 1971).
170. East Bay Municipal Employees, Local 390 v. County of Alameda, 3 Cal. App. 3d
578, 584, 83 Cal. Rptr. 503, 508 (1970). But see Social Workers Union Local 535 v. County
of Los Angeles, 270 Cal. App. 2d 65, 75 Cal. Rptr. 566 (1969), refusing to enforce a
promise by county officials that striking employees would be reinstated without loss of
fringe benefits. The court in the County of Alameda case distinguished the holding in the
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The quoted language comes from a decision involving a strike
settlement agreement, where the question of enforceability is
complicated by the probable illegality of the strike. The reasoning
should apply afortioriwhere no strike is involved.
If public agencies may enter into enforceable agreements with
employee organizations under the MMB Act as the courts have
indicated, 17 ' there would appear to be no legal reason why the
agreement could not provide for enforcement through grievance
procedures leading to binding arbitration rather than through the
courts. 72 The MMB Act says nothing about that issue, and most
jurisdictions which make provision for arbitration procedures,
perhaps assuming that binding awards are not permissible, have made
the arbitrator's award advisory only. 73 An increasing number of

Los Angeles case on the ground that the promise was made without authority and in
violation of the city's civil service rules. 3 Cal. App. 3d at 585-86, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 508-09.
171. Cf., State v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 37 Cal. 2d 412, 232 P.2d 857
(1951), holding invalid a collective bargaining agreement between the Board of State
Harbor Commissioners and various railroad unions. The union suggests that a
governmental body requires statutory approval to enter into such an agreement, since "the
terms and conditions of government employment are traditionally fixed by legislation and
administrative regulations, not by contract." Id. at 417. It is significant, however, that the
employees in question were covered by civil service and that various provisions of the
agreement were found to conflict with civil service laws. Id. at 414. The holding may be
limited, therefore, to the proposition that a governmental body may not enter into a
collective bargaining agreement which conflicts with applicable statutes or regulations. In
any event, East Bay Municipal Employees, Local 390 v. County of Alameda, 3 Cal. App.
3d 5789 83 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1970), strongly suggests that the MMB Act constitutes
legislative approval of binding commitments on matters subject to the meet-and-confer
process. Two superior courts have reached contrary conclusions under the Winton Act.
Jefferson Elementary School Dis't v. Joan Bent, Civ. No. 158146 (San Mateo Super. Ct.,
Nov. 15, 1971); Hayes v. Association of Classroom Teachers, No. 977964 (Los Angeles
Super. Ct., Oct. 20, 1970), in 7 CAL. PUB. EMFL. REL. 49 (1970).
172. On the propriety of agreements for arbitration by governmental bodies See Viola,
Inc. v. Santa Barbara High School Dist., 276 Cal. App. 2d 425, 428, 80 Cal. Rptr. 784,
786-87 (1969); FELDMAN, ARBITRATION LAW IN CALIFORNIA (1957); 3A ANTIEU,
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 30C.06 (1970). Cf., Jefferson Elementary School Dist. v.

Joan Bent, Civ. No. 158146 (San Mateo Super. Ct., Nov. 15, 1971); Hayes v. Association of
Classroom Teachers, No. 977964 (Los Angeles Super. Ct., Oct. 20, 1970), in 7 CAL. PUB.
EMPL. REL. 49 (1970) (holding binding grievance arbitration procedures invalid under the
Winton Act).
Apart from the general validity of binding grievance arbitration, questions arise with
respect to the relationship between such procedures and traditional civil service review
procedures, in many cases established by charter. See Amundson, Negotiated Grievance
Procedures in California Public Employment: Controversy and Confusion, 6 CAL. PUB.
EMPL. REL. 1 (1970). One solution is to provide for waiver of civil service procedures by
an employee who prefers to rely upon a negotiated procedure. See Grodin & Hardin,
Public Employee Bargainingin Oregon,51 ORE. L. REV.- (1972).
173. Amundson, supra note 172; Ross & DeGialluly, supra note 20, at 7. Advisory
arbitration inevitably causes serious problems when the advice is not accepted. For the
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agreements, however, provide for binding arbitration,

74

and at least

one court has ordered arbitration pursuant to such an agreement,

through issuance of a writ of mandate. 175 An amendment to the

statute making clear the propriety of such agreements would be
helpful.
VII. Strikes and Impasse Resolution Procedures
The view of California courts-or, more precisely, of two panels

of the court of appeal with the supreme court declining hearing in
both cases is that strikes by public employees are unlawful in the
absence of legislative validation. 76 The MMB Act does not mention
strikes, and evidence of legislative validation is difficult to find,
particularly in light of section 3509 which specifically denies
legislative intent to make the provisions of section 923 of the Labor
Code applicable to public employees.

77

Consequently, strikes by

employees subject to the MMB Act have been held unlawful in the
of course, to equitable
sense that they may be enjoined subject,
78
defenses and constitutional safeguards.
I tend to the view that a ban on strikes by public employees is
furor created over the Los Angeles County advisory system see Communications: Los
Angeles County Employee Relations Commission, 10 CAL. PUB. EMPL. REL. 37 (1971).
174. Agreements containing provision for binding grievances arbitration have been
entered into by the cities of Concord, Anaheim, and Hayward, the county of Sacramento,
and several special districts. The Employer-Employee Relations Chapter for the city of
Los Angeles provides that each memorandum of understanding "shall provide for final
and binding arbitration of all grievances not resolved in the grievance procedure ... " Los
ANGELES CITY, CAL., ORDINANCE 41,527, § 4.865a. See 8 CAL. PUB. EMPL. REL. 70.
175. Orange County Employees Ass'n v. City of Anaheim, No. M-1768 (Orange
County Super. Ct., Sept. 2, 1971). The county opposed arbitration on the ground that back
pay for a terminated employee was not an arbitrable issue. The propriety of the procedure
was not challenged.
176. City of San Diego v. State, County & Municipal Employees, Local 127, 8 Cal, App.
3d 308, 87 Cal. Rptr. 258 (1970); Almond v. County of Sacramento, 276 Cal. App. 2d 32, 80
Cal. Rptr. 518 (1969). See generally Staudohar, Strikes and Rights of Public Employees in
California,7 CAL. PUB. EMPL. REL. 1 (1970).
177. CAL. LABOR CODE § 923 (West 1971) protects, inter alia, the light of employees to
engage in "concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection." The section protects the right to strike in the private sector. Petri Cleaners,
Inc. v. Automotive Employees, Laundry Drivers & Helpers Local 88, 53 Cal. 2d 455, 471,
349 P.2d 76,86,2 Cal. Rptr. 470,480 (1960).
178. Regarding equitable defenses see School Dist. v. Holland Educ. Ass'n, 380 Mich.
314, 157 N.W.2d 206 (1968) (failure of public employer to accept fact-finding
recommendations may be factor in denying injunction against strike). See Comment,
Collective Bargainingfor Public Employees and the Prevention of Strikes in the Public
Sector, 68 MICH. L. REV. 260 (1969).
Regarding constitutional defenses see In re Berry, 68 Cal. 2d 137, 151, 436 P.2d 273,
283, 65 Cal. Rptr. 273, 283 (1968) (invalidating injunction on the basis of unconstitutional
overbreadth).
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both unwise and inequitable, unless it is limited to strikes which
imperil public health or safety, 179 but I do not argue that position

here. The issue has been debated extensively and ably in other
quarters. 180 The question raised here is, given such a strike-ban policy,
whether the MMB Act makes adequate provision for failure of
agreement in the meet-and-confer process. Most statutes which
operate within a strike-ban policy attach special significance to
participation by neutral third parties in the resolution of bargaining
impasses. Such participation is no substitute for the strike, but it may
serve to stimulate bargaining, satisfy a need for fairness, or both.
Most states provide at least mediation facilities, available upon the
request of either party.181 Many provide for fact-finding with
recommendations.'8 2 A few, mostly with narrow but explicit statutory
for compulsory and binding arbitration of
strike bans, provide
183
bargaining disputes.

179. This is the pattern of recent statutes. For example, Hawaii limits only strikes which
endanger public "health or safety," and then only to the extent that regulations are
imposed by a public agency. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-12(c) (Supp. 1971). Pennsylvania's
new law uses the broader "health, safety or welfare" test, and excludes strikes by guards,
police, fire fighters, and municipal transit employees. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, §§
1101.1001-1003 (Supp. 1971). See Reports and Recommendations of the Governor's
Commission to Revise the Public Employee Law of Pennsylvania, GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP.
No. 251, E-1 (July 1, 1968); Wright, The PennsylvaniaPublic Employee Relations Act, 51
ORE. L. REV.- (1972). Vermont's law is similar. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 1704 (Supp.
1971) (municipal employees). Montana allows public (as well as private) nurses to strike
under specified conditions; and official bodies in two other states-Colorado and
Maryland-have recommended adoption of limited strike legislation. Seidman, supra note
2, at 18-20.
180. Compare Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment, 67 MICH. L. REV. 931 (1969)
(pro-strike), with Anderson, Strikes and Impasse Resolution in Public Employment, 67
MICH. L. REv. 943 (1969) (antistrike). Compare Wellington & Winter, The Limits of
Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107, 1123-25 (1969)
(antistrike) with Burton & Krider, The Role and Consequences of Strikes by Public
Employees, 79 YALE LJ. 418 (1970) (prostrike).
181. See Seidman, supra note 2.
182. Id For evaluation of fact-finding in the public sector See Gould, Public
Employment: Mediation, Fact Finding and Arbitration,55 A.B.A.J. 835 (1969); McKelvey,
Fact Finding in Public Employment Disputes: Promise or Illusion?, 22 IND. & LAB. REL.
REV. 528 (1969); Wurf, The Use of Fact-Findingin Public-Employee Dispute Settlement,
ARBITRATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE (Proceedings of 22d Annual Meeting, Nat'l
Academy of Arbitrators) 99 (1970); Zack, Improving Mediation and Fact-Findingin the
Public Sector, 21 LAB. L.J. 259 (1970).
183. Seidman, supra note 2. For discussion of utility and legality of arbitration to
determine bargaining disputes in the public sector see Wellington & Winter, Structuring
Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 79 YALE L.J. 805, 831-37 (1970);
Loewenberg, Compulsory Binding Arbitration in the Public Sector (unpublished paper
prepared for International Symposium on Public Employment Labor Relations, New
York City, May 4, 1971); Note, Legality and Propriety of Agreements to Arbitrate Major
and MinorDisputes in PublicEmployment, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 129 (1968).
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The MMB Act does none of the above. Section 3505.2 provides
that if the parties fail to reach agreement after a reasonable period of
time, they may agree together upon the appointment of a mediator
and share his costs. That is the sum total of the act's impasse

resolution procedures. 184 Taken literally and in isolation, the section
seems wholly unnecessary. Surely a public employer and an employee

organization could agree to mediation without state legislative
approval. In one case an employee association argued that in order to
give section 3502.2 some practical meaning it should be read in
conjunction with section 3505, to the effect that a party may violate its
duty to meet and confer in good faith if it refuses mediation without
reasonable cause. 185 The superior court rejected that argument, 186 and
the case is on appeal. 187 Whatever the outcome, it is apparent that the

subject requires further legislative attention.
VII. Conclusion
The most notable qualities of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act are
its sketchiness and its vagueness. It does not say very much about the

critical issues which confront labor-management relations in the
public sector, and what it does say it says with confusing lack of
clarity. It would be a mistake, however, to attribute these
characteristics simply to sloppy draftsmanship. There was some of
that, to be sure, but to a greater extent the sketchiness and the

vagueness reflect legislative indecision in the face of varying views
and conflicting political forces. Unions, by and large, favored a system
patterned closely after the federal private sector model. Independent
associations were wary of the private sector approach, principally
184. Section 3507 permits local governments to adopt rules and regulations providing
for "additional procedures for the resolution of disputes." Most cities which have adopted
rules on the subject provide for voluntary mediation, or in some cases voluntary
fact-finding, with final determination by the city council if the parties do not agree. County
ordinances follow a similar but more ambiguous pattern. A few cities and counties provide
for mediation or fact finding at the request of either party, and several provide for
voluntary submission to binding arbitration. Ross &DeGialluly, supranote 20.
The city of Vallejo is unique among California public agencies in providing for
compulsory and binding arbitration of negotiation disputes. 11 CAL. PUB. EMPL. REL. 30.
Voters in the city of Sacramento recently defeated a city charter initiative amendment
which would have established such a system for that city. IL at 31.
185. Support for that view is found in the ACIR Report, supra note 56, stating that the
"good faith" concept "requires both parties to be receptive to mediation if bona fide
differences of opinion produce an impasse." But the recent amendment to section 3505
(supra note 129), referring to resolution procedures provided or agreed upon, arguably
supports a permissive view.
186. Alameda County Employees Ass'n v. County of Alameda, No. 392888 (Alameda
Super. Ct., Dec. 8,1969).
187. Civ. No. 28520 (Ct. App., 1st Dist., filed July 22,1970).
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because they feared it would operate to their detriment. The League
of California Cities was agreeable to some form of regulation but
opposed state control on more than a minimal basis. The legislature,
rather than attempting to resolve the differences, in effect
incorporated them into the statute. Organizational rights are declared
to be protected, but no means are provided for their protection. Local
governments are directed to meet and confer with recognized
employee organizations, but nothing is said about the criteria or the
procedures by which recognition is to be affected. The duty to meet
and confer in good faith is defined in terms similar to the federal duty
to bargain, but it is hedged with ambiguous and arguably conflicting
limitations. Mutual agreement is recognized as a proper goal of the
meet-and-confer process, but the statute is unclear as to whether
agreements, once approved by the governing body, become
enforceable. The entire subject of strikes and impasse resolution
procedures is avoided, except for the declaration that the parties may
elect to engage a mediator. What emerges is a rather general
legislative blessing for collective bargaining at the local governmental
level without clear delineation of policy or means for its
implementation. The courts have, on the whole, done an admirable
job of exegesis, but their decisions cannot help but reflect the
underlying weakness of the text.
There is something to be said for a statute which encourages
local governments to adopt their own procedures for recognition and
bargaining without subjecting them to needless uniformity. New
York's Taylor Act, for example, is based on that premise. There is
very little to be said for a statute which fails to provide either
comprehensive guidelines or machinery to insure compliance with
fundamental state policies. It is apparent, then, that the MMB Act
requires major revamping. It is not only that act which needs
attention; the legislature must, sooner or later, confront the broad
range of public employee labor relations in California and consider
whether it is appropriate that local government employees, state
employees, and employees of school districts should be subject to
substantially different forms of state regulation.
Whether the necessary task of revision can be accomplished
satisfactorily in the normal course of the legislative process is, judging
from past events, highly questionable. Many of the states which have
developed more sophisticated public employee bargaining legislation
have done so after careful study and report by a legislative or
gubernatorial commission. There seems to be something in the nature
of the subject matter, or its political environment, which renders ad
hoc legislative efforts inevitably awkward. The legislative problem
could be substantially alleviated if the various affected interest groups
could develop a politically effective consensus on needed revision,
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and that is not as improbable as it might sound. The defects in
California's current statutory scheme are not one-sided. They plague
public employers as well as employee organizations with obscurity
and uncertainty; in city halls and county administration buildings as
well as in labor temples and association offices one hears rumblings of
the need for change. Moreover, the historically wide gap between the
views of affiliated unions and independent associations has narrowed
perceptibly in recent years. But, given the variety of interests at stake
and the complexity of the issues, agreement on comprehensive
revision seems unlikely without substantial prodding. It is time for
California to rejoin the movement toward rational development of
collective bargaining for public employees which it helped to start.
Possibly the most effective way to do that is through the kind of
commission approach which other states have found so helpful.

Author's Note: An appellate decision rendered after this article went to press holds that a
city violated the MMB Act by granting exclusive recognition to an employee organization
as representative of all city employees and denying recognition to a firefighters' union to
represent those firefighters who are members. Los Angeles County Firefighters Local
1014 v. City of Monrovia, 2 Civ. No. 38648 (Ct. App., 2d Dist., March 22, 1972). Consistent
with the reasoning of this article, the court rejected the city's contention that section 3500
allows a public agency to avoid the statute by adopting conflicting rules and policies; but
the decision is unclear as to why there was a conflict. Contrary to the reasoning of this
article, the case appears to adopt a requirement of general recognition. The same result
could be reached by holding that a city-wide unit was inappropriate.

